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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs frequently prevail only to find postjudgment that
the defendant or its assets are outside the jurisdiction of the
ruling court. Without voluntary compliance or adequate
prejudgment attachment-both of which are frequently absent-the plaintiff can achieve a meaningful victory only if it
can enforce the judgment in the court of a country where the
losing party or its assets can be found. The courts of most countries, including the United States, enforce virtually all such socalled foreign judgments under the doctrine of comity.

2004]

UN-AMERICAN JUDGMENTS

785

What if the foreign judgment, however, is based on a foreign law that the Constitution precludes an American polity
from enacting? Consider, for instance, a French judgment
founded on a French hate speech law that First Amendment jurisprudence would not allow the Congress to enact.' Similarly,
what should a U.S. court do with an English defamation judgment based on British libel law, which is more pro-plaintiff
than
current constitutional doctrine allows American law to
2
be?
All American courts to date that have confronted this question have concluded that it would be unconstitutional to enforce
such foreign judgments.3 I argued in an earlier article that this
conclusion is mistaken.4 While such foreign judgments may
well be "un-American" insofar as they come from non-American
polities and reflect political values that are at variance with
American constitutional law, neither the foreign judgments
themselves, nor their enforcement by an American court, is unconstitutional.' Having shown in that article that the Constitution does not answer the question of whether American courts
can enforce "un-American" judgments, this Article generates a
framework for identifying and analyzing the policy considerations that properly inform the determination of whether such
judgments should be enforced. The framework also sheds considerable light on the enforcement of the usual run of foreign
judgments by identifying some unspoken yet nonaxiomatic
assumptions that underlie the comity case law.
In addition to providing guidance as to how as a substantive matter enforcement decisions ought to be made, this Article's analysis has institutional implications. Drawing on game
theory and Rawlsian political theory, the Article shows why deciding whether "un-American" foreign judgments are to be en1. This precise question was presented in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre
le Racisme et LAntisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The
facts of the case are discussed infra Part I. The court's legal reasoning is critiqued in Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2004) (manuscript at Part II.C).
2. This question was presented in Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992), and in Telnikoff v. Matesuvitch,
702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997). The facts of both cases are discussed infra Part I.
The courts' legal analyses are discussed and critiqued in Rosen, supra note 1
(manuscript at Part II.A-B).
3. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part IIA-B).
4. See id. (manuscript at Part III).
5. See id.
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forced almost always implicates deeply political questions that
are best decided by the more political branches under conventional theories of democracy. Moreover, even after the difficult
value judgments have been made, much of the decision making
turns on information that is difficult for a court not only to access but also to process. Treaties and executive agreements,'
both of which typically involve ex ante negotiations among
countries, may be the most promising mechanisms for generating a policy as regards un-American judgments.7 This insight is
particularly timely, for the United States is currently participating in a multilateral attempt to draft an international
treaty concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments under
the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law.8
If the executive and legislative branches do not ultimately
produce a policy with respect to un-American judgments, it will
be left to the courts to decide whether such judgments are to be
enforced. 9 In the main, this is how things currently are. This
Article's analytical framework offers useful guidance to courts
in the event the status quo does not change, though several
crucial determinations that must be made admittedly push the
limits of judicial competency. (Indeed, this is one reason why
formulating an enforcement policy is best left to the more political branches of government.)
To be clear, the Article does not in the end endorse a game
theoretic, Rawlsian, or any other particular approach to foreign
relations. The unwillingness to champion any single normative
framework is a reflection of the Article's conclusion that deciding which approach to adopt is an intensely subjective, political
6. So-called executive agreements with other countries do not require
approval from either house of Congress. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123
S. Ct. 2374, 2386-87 (2003).
7. For an important caveat, see infra note 180.
8. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and ComMatters, Oct. 30, 1999, http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/
mercial
draft36e.html.
9. Federal courts could throw the question back to other branches of government by finding enforceability to be a nonjusticiable political question, but
this seems unlikely. The political question doctrine is seldom successfully invoked, it never has been relied on in this context, and, in any event, it would
limit only federal courts, not state courts. See generally Rachel E. Barkow,
More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 298 n.368, 300-19
(2002).
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process. The Article does, though, elaborate some of the implications of each normative rubric so that the decision maker understands what is entailed by a commitment to either game
theory or Rawlsianism. Moreover, the Article shows that, under
both game theoretic and Rawlsian approaches, many of the
standard objections to enforcing un-American judgments fall
away upon careful analysis. Most of the time, nonetheless, the
ultimate decision as to whether an un-American judgment
should be enforced requires a trade-off among competing interests that invariably calls upon the decision maker's ante-legal
commitments.
Finally, this Article's analysis underscores the practical
costs of the contemporary case law's erroneous analysis. To
date, courts have categorically refused to enforce un-American
judgments on the view that doing so would be unconstitutional.' ° This Article shows that a broad range of approaches to
international relations gives rise to the conclusion that such a
categorical refusal to enforce un-American judgments is unwise. Rather, un-American judgments should be enforced at
least some of the time.
The Article is divided into five parts. To illustrate concretely what is at stake, the first part briefly surveys the cases
in which American courts have been asked to enforce unAmerican judgments. Part II identifies the lessons that can be
drawn from the extensive case law concerning the enforceability of simple foreign judgments-those where the underlying
legal right could have been created by an American polity. The
case law is a helpful first step, but it is insufficiently robust to
provide much guidance with regard to un-American judgments
beyond identifying the various parties and institutions whose
interests are affected by enforceability determinations.
Part III argues that trading off among the parties and institutions when their preferences conflict with respect to the
enforcement of foreign judgments frequently requires recourse
to ante-legal political commitments. Part III illustrates this by
drawing on two very different normative approaches to foreign
relations, game theory and Rawls's international political theory. Although there are other approaches to international relations, Part III explains why analyzing foreign judgments from
the vantage point of these two perspectives is particularly instructive. Part III then develops the basic analytics of game
10.

See Rosen, supranote 1 (manuscript at Part II).
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theory and Rawlsian theory and applies each to the case of
simple foreign judgments. Interestingly, although the doctrines
each theory prescribes are importantly different in several fundamental respects, both game theory and Rawlsian theory lead
to the common conclusion that most simple foreign judgments
should be enforced.
Part IV extends the game theoretic and Rawlsian approaches to the more complex case of un-American judgments.
The analysis demonstrates why, far more than in the case of
simple foreign judgments, determining whether un-American
judgments should be enforced is best handled by the more political branches of government. Though both game theory and
Rawlsian theory reject the view that American courts categorically should not enforce un-American judgments, the two approaches lead to different enforcement determinations much of
the time. Part V synthesizes the previous part's conclusions
into a workable framework, which is then applied to the cases
surveyed in Part I in which courts have been confronted with
un-American judgments. A short conclusion follows.
I. WHAT IS AT STAKE
Our analysis of un-American judgments will be aided by
understanding some concrete scenarios where the issue of enforcing such foreign judgments has arisen. This part briefly
surveys three cases." The reasoning used by each court will not
concern us now, for all three utilized defective constitutional
analysis that led the courts to decline to enforce the foreign
judgments. 2 What is important is to get a sense of the issues
that arise when such foreign judgments are presented to
American courts.
The prevailing plaintiff in Telnikoff v. Matusevitch 3 had
been a leading activist for human rights in the Soviet Union
since the 1950s.14 Telnikoff was a resident of England at the
time that defendant Matusevich wrongly accused him of being
anti-Semitic and racist in a letter published in the Daily Tele-

11. For a more complete discussion, see id.
12. See id. (manuscript at Part III).
13. The dispute between these parties was heard in both state and federal
courts in the United States. See Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md.
1997); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995), affd, 159 F.3d
636 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion).
14. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 6.
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graph, an English newspaper. 5 The letter concerned the British Broadcasting Company's recruitment policies for their Rus-7
16
sian service. Telnikoff sued for defamation in English court.'
Under English law, defendant Matusevitch had the burden of
proving that the allegedly defamatory remarks were true,
whereas under American law, the plaintiff would have had to
show that the defendant had asserted falsehoods with malice
since plaintiff Telnikoff was a limited public figure. 8 Telnikoff
was awarded £240,000 in damages, but Matusevitch relocated
himself and his assets to the United States before Telnikoff
could collect.' 9 Telnikoff accordingly sued in courts in the
United States to enforce his English judgment.20
The prevailing plaintiff in Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications,Inc.21 was a non-American living outside of the United
States who had been libeled by a false news report that had
appeared in an English newspaper.2 2 The defendant, India
Abroad, was a New York news service with a subsidiary in
England.23 India Abroad transmitted reports internationally
and printed newspapers in the United States and England.2 4
The story in question, which had been written by a reporter in
London, falsely reported that Swiss authorities had frozen a
bank account belonging to Mr. Bachchan because the account
was connected to a company that had been charged with paying
kickbacks to obtain contracts with the Indian government. 2'
The news service's English subsidiary printed and distributed a
copy of India Abroad in England.2 6 The story also was reported
27
in an issue of the defendant's New York newspaper.
Mr. Bachchan sued for defamation in England for the story
that had appeared in the English newspaper, but not in India

15. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 232-35.
16. Id. at 233 (reproducing Matusevitch's letter in its entirety).
17. Id. at 233-34.
18. Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 3-5.
19. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 235 (explaining the English court's decision and
Telnikoffs unsuccessful attempt to have his judgment enforced against

Matusevitch in the United States).
20. Id.
21.

585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 661-62.
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Abroad's New York paper. 2 The English court applied English
defamation law. 9 In contrast to what would have been necessary under U.S. defamation law, Mr. Bachchan was not required under English law to show that the press defendant
acted with malice. The English court awarded Bachchan a
£40,000 judgment to be paid by IndiaAbroad and its reporter.31
Because the defendant's assets were in the United States, however, Bachchan sued in New York to enforce the British judgment.32
In Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme,3 3 two French nonprofits dedicated to eliminating anti-Semitism faced off against Yahoo!, a California-based
Internet service provider. 3'French law prohibits the exhibition
of Nazi propaganda and artifacts for sale 35 -a content-based restriction that no American polity could enact due to the First
Amendment.3 6 Computer terminals in France were able to access an auction site through Yahoo! on which Nazi memorabilia
was offered for sale. Plaintiffs sued Yahoo! in a French court
for violating French law.38 The High Court of Paris determined
that it was technologically possible for Yahoo! to block access to
select sites (like the Nazi auction sites) by only those computers
that were sitting in France.39 It ordered Yahoo! to do so, and
imposed a penalty of 100,000 Francs (approximately U.S.
$13,300) for each day of noncompliance. 0
The Yahoo! computers that were ordered to be reconfigured
and Yahoo!'s assets, however, were located in the United

28. Id.
29. Id. at 662.
30. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part II.A).
31. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
32. Id.; see Kyu Ho Youm, Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run Around U.S. Libel Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
235, 246 n.85 (1994) (noting that Mr. Bachchan's attorney argued that "assets
were unavailable in Britain"). See generally id. at 256-62 (praising the
Bachchan decision).
33. 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
34. Id. at 1183.
35. Id. at 1184.
36. Id. at 1189.
37. Id. at 1184.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1191 n.10 (noting the "French Court's factual determination
that Yahoo! does possess the technology to comply with the French order").
40. Id. at 1185.
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States.4" Yahoo! did not voluntarily comply with the French
court's order.42 The plaintiffs would have had to sue in a U.S.
court to enforce the French order. Yahoo! acted first, however,
seeking a declaratory judgment that enforcing the French order
would violate the First Amendment. 43 The U.S. district court refused to enforce the foreign un-American judgment, just as the
Bachchan and Matesuvitch courts did.
II. LESSONS AND LIMITS OF THE COMITY CASE LAW
Though American courts only recently have grappled with
un-American judgments, they long have confronted judgments
from foreign countries.44 Many such foreign judgments have
been predicated on foreign laws with no analogues in American
law, and still others on foreign laws that reflected policies that
differed from domestic policies unrelated to constitutional issues.45' This part surveys the American doctrines that have been
developed in respect of such "simple" foreign judgments for the
purpose of drawing guidance vis-&-vis un-American judgments.
The comity case law provides a helpful first step, though it is
insufficiently developed to resolve the enforcement questions
that are presented by un-American judgments. In fact, the
analysis that follows identifies some deficiencies that equally
apply to the doctrine governing the enforcement of simple foreign judgments.
A. THE NORM OF ENFORCEMENT

As a matter of positive law, American courts almost always
enforce foreign judgments under a comity analysis. 4' The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states that a "judgment
rendered in a foreign nation ...will, if valid, usually be given
the same effect as a sister State judgment.'1 7 Because the Con41. The French court's order provided that no assessed penalties could be
collected from Yahoo! France, a subsidiary of Yahoo! whose site was in compliance with the French law. Id.
42. See id. at 1186.
43. Id.
44. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Parts I-II) (discussing three
recent decisions and noting that the United States "has been at the vanguard
of enforcing foreign judgments" since the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in
Hilton v. Guyot, 150 U.S. 113 (1895)).
45. See id. (manuscript at Part I) (discussing the enforcements of judgments that were contrary to American public policy).
46. See id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c (1971); see
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stitution almost
requires one state to enforce sis48
. categorically
ter state judgments, the Restatement rule means that "valid"
foreign judgments will be enforced by American courts. Foreign
judgments are deemed to be "valid" if the foreign court properly
asserted personal jurisdiction and if the foreign tribunal utilized procedures that were not fundamentally unfair.49 If these
conditions are met, the Restatement instructs that the foreign

judgment should be enforced unless "the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in
the State where enforcement is sought." ° This last caveat is
what is referred to as the public policy exception." The norm of
enforcement is so strong that virtually all jurisdictions have rejected the so-called reciprocity doctrine, adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in the nineteenth century, which conditioned American enforcement on the foreign country's past enforcement of American judgments. 2

The handful of statutes and treaties that address the enforcement of specific types of judgments or their analoguessuch as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition
Act" and the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,4-are structured
along the same lines as the Restatement. They require that a
United States court enforce the judgment or arbitral award
also id. § 98 (stating that a "valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after
a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States so
far as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned"). No reported cases have rejected the Restatement's approach to the
enforcement of foreign judgments.
48. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). The first
court's judgment must be enforced even if it is based on a law that is antithetical to the second state's public policy. See id.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92, 98 cmt. a
(1971).

50. Id. § 117 cmt. c.
51. See id. This stands in dramatic contrast to the law that is applicable
in the purely domestic context, for the Supreme Court has ruled that there is
no public policy exception that permits a court to refuse to enforce the judgment of a sister state. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 (stating that "[the Court's]
decisions support no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and credit
due judgments").
52. The Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of reciprocity in Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). Most jurisdictions have rejected it. See EUGENE F.
SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1191 (3d ed. 2000). For a good discussion of

why the doctrine of reciprocity does not bind state courts, and probably does
not bind federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction, see id.
53. 13 U.L.A. 43 (2002).
54. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1999).
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unless there is fraud or if doing so would be repugnant to the
public policy of the enforcing forum.55 There is no reciprocity
requirement.
As I have shown elsewhere, both caveats to the general
rule of enforcement have been construed narrowly.56 Most pertinent for present purposes, the vast majority of American
courts have interpreted the public policy exception narrowly.57
Enforcement is deemed to violate public policy only if the
judgment is "repugnant";58 a common formulation is that "the
public policy exception to the doctrine of comity is usually invoked only in the rare instance 'where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in
the State where enforcement is sought."'59 Courts refer to the
public policy exception as a "high standard" that is "narrow in
scope," and as a doctrine that is available only in "exceptional
cases" or the "rare case."" As one court has stated,
courts in the United States normally will not deny recognition merely
because the law or practice of the foreign country differs, even if
markedly from that of the recognition forum. As Judge Cardozo observed: "We are not so provincial as to say that every solution
of a
61
problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home."

Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that foreign judgments should be enforced even if "the
original claim could not have been maintained in a State of the

55.

See, e.g., UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, §§ 3-

4, 13 U.L.A. 49 (2002) (declaring that a foreign money judgment "is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit," subject only to caveats such as lack of jurisdiction, fraud,
and violations of public policy); see also Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar S.P.A.,
417 F. Supp. 207, 213-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussing the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and
the implementing U.S. legislation).
56. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part I).
57.
58.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c (1971).

59. In re Will of Brown, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 341 (Sur. Ct. 1986).
60. For a complete discussion, see Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at
Part I).
61. See Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856, 861 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (enforcing a Belgian judgment, though the claim was based on Belgian law providing
a thirty-year statute of limitations) (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120
N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918)). The Milhoux case did not differentiate between
public policy in relation to the application of law (as was the issue in Loucks)
and public policy in relation to judgments (the issue in Milhoux). I leave for
another day the question of whether the scope of the public policy exception
should vary between laws and judgments.
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United States."63 Case holdings are consistent with this judicial
rhetoric. 3
B. POLICIES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMITY CASE LAW

The late nineteenth century United States Supreme Court
case of Hilton v. Guyot64 provided what has become the canonical explanation of comity as it relates to the enforcement of foreign judgments:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation ... nor of mere courtesy and good will .... But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to both
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.65

Hilton thus alludes to three sets of interests: the international
system, the persons who are under the protection of American
law, and the country that has issued the judgment.
Subsequent courts that have confronted requests to enforce
foreign judgments have echoed these interests and provided
guidance in understanding their content (as will be described in
the immediately following paragraphs). With regard to the interests of the international system, courts have noted that enforcement "produce[s] a friendly intercourse between the sovereignties."6 Among other things, this facilitates the smooth
functioning of international business and the international system. As one court has observed, "the increasing internationalization of commerce requires that United States courts recognize and respect the judgments entered by foreign courts to the
greatest extent consistent with our own ideals of justice. 'Unfettered trade, good will among nations, and a vigorous and stable
international-and national-economy demand no less.' 68
Hilton's second set of interests-the interests of the persons under protection of American law-have been shoe-horned

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c (1971).
63. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part I).
64. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
65. Id. at 163-64. The Hilton Court did not ultimately enforce the judgment before it on the ground that France would not have enforced the United
States's judgment. See id. at 228-29.
66. Id. at 165.
67. See Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing the increase in international commerce).
68. Id. (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

62.
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by recent courts into a res judicata style analysis. 69 Foreign
judgments are enforced to protect the party who has prevailed
in the earlier litigation from having to relitigate and to keep
one party from harassing another by filing endless lawsuits in
different
countries based on the identical transaction or occur70
rence. Courts also have concluded that it is fair that the losing
party be bound to the foreign judgment if the court that issued
the judgment indeed had personal jurisdiction over the parties.7 These courts also have noted that enforcement can eliminate duplicative proceedings and thereby conserve scarce judicial resources, a res judicata benefit that does not inure to the
direct benefit of the litigating parties. 2
With regard to Hilton's third set of interests, contemporary
courts have understood comity as reflecting the appropriate respect that one sovereign should accord the official acts of another sovereign. 71 Such language and style of reasoning draw on
a similar conception of sovereignty that is found in the act of
state doctrine.74 The seminal early cases articulating this understanding utilized reasoning that reflected the view that sovereignty carried with it some inevitable content. For example,
the Supreme Court stated such things as "[e]very sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State"75 and "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute ....Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty. .. ."7' This form of
reasoning presumes that legal categories (such as "sovereignty") have some innate, predetermined content. 77 Such a
69. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841-42 (2d Cir. 1986).
70. Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 282 (Okla.
1990).
71. See infra Part IV.A (explaining why this is so even if the losing party
is an American and the judgment is based on law that an American polity
could not have enacted).
72. See Panama Processes, 796 P.2d at 282.
73. See, e.g., In re Will of Brown, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 337 (Sur. Ct. 1986)
(noting that comity reflects that "respect is due to the judicial act of another
sovereign"); cf. Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518
(11th Cir. 1994) (speaking of the "proper level of respect for the acts of our fellow sovereign nations" in the analogous context of "international abstention").
74. See, e.g., European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456,
472-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
75. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
76. Schooner Exch. v. Mc'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
77.

See,

e.g.,
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jurisprudential assumption is open to question. 8 At the very
least, there are strong reasons to doubt the notion that sovereignty necessarily implies some set of powers and immunities;
the rise of human rights law and international institutions
such as the United Nations certainly has undermined the earlier, widely held view that sovereigns ipso facto can do whatever they wish within their borders. 9 Arguments invoking the
concept that sovereigns are owed certain respect accordingly
are best understood not as assertions that sovereigns enjoy certain powers as an a priori matter, but as claims that comity is
consistent with a widely held contemporary understanding that
sovereigns enjoy a particular power."
Modern courts have introduced an additional argument in
favor of enforcing foreign judgments.8 ' Enforcement under comity is said to promote the separation of powers interest of limiting judicial interference with the legislative and executive
branches' conduct of foreign policy.82 Behind this goal is the belief that the other two branches are more institutionally competent to construct a wise and coherent policy.83 This same understanding concerning the institutional competencies of the
various branches is a cornerstone of the act of state and political question doctrines.
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1983).

78. See id. at 5-8.
79. See JoHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 27 (1999) (referring approvingly to the proposition that "changes in the powers of sovereignty from one
period to another arise from the changes that occur in peoples' ideas of right
and just domestic government"); see also id. at 27 n.23 (same); Stephen D.
Krasner, Rethinking the Sovereign State Model, 27 REv. INTL STUD., Dec.
2001, at 17, 17 (arguing that "[bireaches of the sovereign state model have
been an enduring characteristic of the international environment").
80. See RAWLS, supra note 79, at 27 (stating that the role of the people is
to provide a limitation on the internal sovereignty of their government).
81. State courts are not limited by the Supreme Court's conception of comity because the enforcement of foreign judgments in state courts is not a matter of federal law. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 52, at 1191.
82. See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 60 F. Supp. 2d 267, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that "comity
in the international context (in conjunction with separation of powers principles) require[s] deference to international and executive branch processes and
efforts to establish coherent policies on matters of substantial public concern"),
affd in part and vacated in part, 218 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2000).
83. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing separation of power concerns and the reluctance of
courts to decide issues surrounding foreign law).
84. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S.
400, 404 (1990) (noting that the act of state doctrine is "a consequence of do-
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C. LIMITS OF THE COMITY CASE LAW

Courts invoking comity almost always draw on one or more
of these policy considerations." The analysis tends to be ipse
dixit in character, however, with courts merely reciting these
considerations and then asserting the conclusion that the simple foreign judgment should be enforced.86 Perhaps this is because the courts are of the view that all considerations point to
the conclusion that the foreign judgment should be enforced.
This is incorrect, however. For instance, enforcing even simple
88
foreign judgments imposes costs on the international system.
Disregard of the countervailing considerations is particularly
problematic when analyzing un-American judgments, for some
of these drawbacks to enforcement are more acute than is the
case with simple foreign judgments. For example, while it ordinarily might be fair to enforce a foreign judgment against a losmestic separation of powers"); 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 218 F.3d at 164 (noting
that the political question doctrine "is a function of the constitutional framework of separation of powers"); European Cmty., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 472 (noting that the comity, act of state, and political question doctrines all reflect
separation of powers concerns).
Admittedly, the separation-of-powers-induced norm of noninterference
does not, on its own, determine the substantive content of comity; noninterference would be equally realized by a doctrine under which no foreign judgments
were enforced. Such an approach would be akin to the political question doctrine, under which federal courts refrain from acting at all. See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting the circumstances under which federal courts
will dismiss for want of jurisdiction and denominating such circumstances the
political question doctrine). Practically speaking, however, because the aforementioned res judicata and international cooperation policies have led to the
creation of a comity doctrine under which foreign judgments typically are enforced, enforcement has become the baseline norm and expectation. Consequently, it is deviations from this norm-that is, nonenforcement of the foreign judgment-that risk alienating other countries and hence interfering
with the executive and legislative branches' administration of foreign policy.
For this reason, the separation-of-powers norm of judicial noninterference, as
a practical matter, is reflected in a comity doctrine that generously enforces
foreign judgments and that does not apply a strict public policy exception.
85. See, e.g., Van Den Biggelaar v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848, 858-60
(N.D. Ind. 1997); Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276,
282-84 (Okla. 1990).
86. See, e.g., Van Den Biggelaar, 978 F. Supp. at 858-60; Milhoux v.
Linder, 902 P.2d 856, 860-61 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995); Panama Processes, 796
P.2d at 282-83.
87. See, e.g., Van Den Biggelaar, 978 F. Supp. at 858 (noting that U.S.
courts "normally will give effect to ... judicial acts of a foreign nation"); Panama Processes, 796 P.2d at 282 (observing that the present judicial trend is
to acknowledge foreign judgments).
88. See infra PartIV.D.
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ing party, considerations might be different if the losing party
is a U.S. citizen and the underlying legal right is premised on a
foreign law that an American jurisdiction could not constitutionally enact.89
Moreover, the canonical Hilton formulation omits mention
of a prominent interested entity: the enforcing jurisdiction. To
be sure, American interests are not wholly ignored under comity. If a foreign judgment violates "public policy," then the public policy exception instructs that the judgment is not to be enforced.9"
The
public
policy exception,
however,
is
problematically undertheorized. Structurally, public policy is a
"unilateralist" doctrine that considers only the interests of one
jurisdiction and does not take account of the effects that follow
in other jurisdictions.9 Why should public policy be unilateralist? Similarly, why is it the case that nonenforcement owing to
the public policy exception is so rare? Comity and the public
policy exception lack sufficient theoretical robustness to answer
these questions. This inadequacy is particularly troublesome
with regard to un-American judgments, for such judgments always implicate public policy concerns. 9'
D. LESSONS OF THE COMITY CASE LAW
The comity case law helpfully identifies the parties and entities whose interests are affected by enforcement determinations: the litigants, the country that has issued the judgment,
the country that is being asked to enforce the foreign judgment,
and the international system as a whole.9 Some recent cases
have spoken of the relevant considerations in different terms,
invoking res judicata and separation of powers considerations. 94
It seems to me that analysis of enforcement questions is facili89. See infra Part IV.A.2.
90. See supra Part II.A.
91. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Conflict-of-Laws Theory:
An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 107-10
(1998) (providing a useful definition of unilateralism).
92. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part II) (discussing three recent un-American judgment cases that implicated public policy issues surrounding the First Amendment).
93. See supra Part II.B.
94. See, e.g., 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed.
Republic of Yugoslavia, 281 F.3d 152, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (separation of
powers); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1986) (res judicata); Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276, 283 (Okla.
1990) (res judicata).
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tated if the inquiry instead focuses on the affected parties and
entities. This suggestion to a large extent is a disagreement
only with the organizational scheme recent courts have used; I
do not suggest that the concerns captured by res judicata and
separation of powers are irrelevant, only that they should be
differently grouped.
There are very real benefits to reframing the inquiry with
the "entity-by-entity" analysis I suggest. Fixing attention on
the affected parties and entities reduces the likelihood that
relevant considerations will be overlooked. It also clarifies the
competing interests at stake when not all factors point to the
same conclusion. Moreover, although the interests of the various parties and entities are not reducible to a common metric,
it is easier to appreciate the tradeoffs involved when focusing
on the parties and entities than when evoking such disparate
conceptions as res judicata and separation of powers.
III. TWO ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS
A. OVERVIEW: NORMATIVITY'S INEVITABILITY

As shown above, the comity and public policy case law collectively recognize five distinct sets of interests that are implicated in enforcement determinations: each of the parties, the
country that issued the judgment, the country that is being
asked to enforce the judgment, and the international system.
Although the comity case law suggests that all considerations
point in favor of enforcement, 5 this Part III shows that valueladen judgments inhere in this to-many-eyes neutral analysis. 96
To see this, consider the following two questions. First, although the stability of the international economic system
surely is implicated by the enforcement of foreign judgments,
why should that matter to an American governmental official
who is deciding whether a foreign judgment should be enforced? Second, why should any weight at all be accorded to the
95. See supra Part II.B.
96. This Article is concerned with identifying a principled, generally applicable policy regarding foreign judgments. It is always possible that a country can formulate an enforcement policy that is specific to its bilateral relations with a single country. For example, as part of the effort to conclude the
Iranian hostage crisis, the United States agreed to suspend American claims
against Iran that were pending in American courts without suspending claims
pending against other countries. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
662-63 (1981). This Article will not address such sui generis matters.
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sovereign interests of the country that has issued the judgment? Although traditional comity doctrine accords importance
to these two factors,9 7 their significance is not self-evident. For
example, game theory postulates that U.S. conduct of foreign
relations, of which enforcement of foreign judgments is a part,
should be strictly determined by what is in U.S. interests. 9 8 At
the same time, it cannot be assumed that game theory's approach is some natural baseline for analyzing foreign relations.
I illustrate this by fleshing out a competing "fairness" approach
that is found in John Rawls's The Law of Peoples,99 for which
the interests of other countries and the international system
are relevant.
Analyzing the enforceability of foreign judgments from
game theoretic and Rawlsian perspectives, as the rest of this
part does, is valuable for several reasons. Although game theory and Rawlsian analysis do not exhaust the possible normative approaches that can be taken to international relations,' 0
the two methodologies reflect important competing impulses
found in both the academy and government.' This is not surprising, for game theory and Rawlsian analysis are polar opposites on a spectrum that runs the gamut of possible approaches
to international relations: wholly self-interested analysis (game
theory) versus what is "fair" from the vantage point of a disin-

97. See supra Part II.B.
98. For an excellent exposition of this approach, see Jack L. Goldsmith &
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1113 (1999). Although Goldsmith and Posner state that their analysis is positive rather than normative, see id. at 1115, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that the two analyses merge together in their scholarship. At any rate, many
other game theorists have advanced their approach in normative terms. See,
e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
99.

RAWLS, supra note 79.

100. For a brief but instructive overview of competing approaches to international relations and international law, see Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1830-40
(2002). For a more complete discussion, see Kenneth W. Abbott, International
Relations Theory, InternationalLaw, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in
Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) [hereinafter Abbott, International Relations Theory], and Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335
(1989).
101. Compare THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1995) (defending a fairness approach), with STEPHEN D.
KRASNER,

SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (defending a self-

interested approach to international relations).
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terested third party (Rawls).' °2 Furthermore, the game theoretic and Rawlsian analyses provided below cut across many of
the approaches to international relations identified by legal
theorists and political scientists. Realism,
liberal theory,0
0
°
6
constructivism, institutionalism,
the managerial model,0 7
and the transnational legal process school0 8 for the most part
aim to explain the way that international law and institutions
operate, not to identify substantively preferable rules. 09 Both
102. This is not to suggest that the Rawlsian approach discussed infra Part
IV.C.3 is the only possible fairness-based rubric that could be taken to foreign
relations. Surely it is not. Moreover, many have argued that the principles of
international relations that properly follow from Rawls's premises are very
different from the principles that Rawls himself derives. See, e.g., Eric
Cavallero, PopularSovereignty and the Law of Peoples, 9 LEGAL THEORY 181,
183 n.6 (2003) (collecting and discussing such sources). For example, whereas
Rawls derives principles of noninterference and nonaggression, Allen Buchanan argues that Rawlsian premises also would give rise to principles of
global equality of opportunity and democratic participation in important
global institutions. See Allen Buchanan, Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a
Vanished Westphalian World, 110 ETHICS 697, 701, 718 (2000). Such important differences in designing a fairness-based rubric only underscore this Article's claim that choosing among the competing approaches to foreign relations
is an inherently subjective, ante-legal process inasmuch as subjectivity extends beyond the choice between game theory and fairness to how a fairness
approach is elaborated. That is to say, although the theorists write as if their
conclusions are a matter of cold logic, the conclusions to which they come are
more likely a function of the different subjective sensibilities that they bring to
their analyses. While space limitations preclude further exploration here into
the competing fairness-based approaches, it is important to emphasize that
this Article's conclusions regarding the inherently political character of the
choices regarding foreign relations are unaffected by the Article's exclusive
focus on Rawls's fairness approach. It is also important not to treat Rawls's
account as metonymic with the fairness-based account of foreign relations.
Rather, Rawls presents one plausible fairness approach. Given Rawls's stature
in contemporary political theory, though, his account is an influential starting
point.
103. See, e.g., KRASNER, supra note 101, at 237-38.
104. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of InternationalPolitics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997).
105. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG
NATIONS (1990); Abbott, International Relations Theory, supra note 100, at
367.
106.

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Steven D. Krasner ed., 1983);

Guzman, supra note 100, at 1839-40.
107. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
(1995).

108. See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV.
181 (1996).

109. See Abbott, InternationalRelations Theory, supra note 100, at 362

802

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:783

game theoretic and Rawlsian analyses of the substantive question of whether foreign judgments should be enforced are relevant to more than one of these approaches to international relations.11 °
Moreover, simultaneously analyzing enforceability in
terms of both game theory and Rawlsian theory generates insights into each that easily could be overlooked if either were
studied in isolation. Awareness of these two possible approaches makes clear that neither is axiomatic. Furthermore,
each recommends a different legal test for analyzing enforceability and, particularly as regards un-American judgments,
different ultimate conclusions."' This suggests that whether to
enforce foreign judgments much of the time requires recourse
to thick theory, even if it is unstated in the analysis." 2 Selecting which thick theory to use involves a value-laden, ante-legal
choice. This is why formulating our country's enforcement policy, particularly with regard to un-American judgments, is best
undertaken by the more political branches.
The rest of Part III introduces the basics of game theoretic
and Rawlsian analytics and applies them to simple foreign
judgments. Part IV applies each approach to un-American judgments.
B. GAME THEORY
Under a game theoretical approach to international relations, countries are assumed to act in such a manner as to
maximize their own parochial interests, where each country's
13
interests are independent of the well-being of other countries.
(noting that "as a social science, [international relations] does not purport to
be... a true 'legal method' capable of answering doctrinal questions").
110. For instance, game theory could have relevance to all approaches,
with the exception perhaps of liberal political theory and constructivism. A
Rawlsian analysis would be amenable to all but a realist approach.
111. See infra Part IV.
112. While this Article's game theoretic and Rawlsian analysis does not definitively establish the impossibility of locating an alternative approach to foreign relations that all persons could agree upon, none has been propounded in
the scholarly literature. Moreover, recognition of the very different expectations that underwrite game theory and Rawlsian analysis casts doubt on the
possibility of finding an approach that could generate consensus. For the classic locus of the effort to find a common denominator among persons bearing
different foundational convictions, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).

113. Game theory analyzes a player's "payoff" for taking a given strategy
by looking only at the costs incurred or benefits attained by that player. See
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The analysis that follows suggests two important things. First,
it is in the best interests of the United States that American
courts enforce simple foreign judgments under most circumstances.114 Second, enforcement might not reliably come about if
left to the courts to decide; bilateral agreements or a multilateral treaty may be necessary to ensure the enforcement of foreign judgments.
1. Foreign Judgments and the Prisoner's Dilemma
A crucial step in game theory is identifying the costs and
benefits that attend each combination of strategies.' Whether
or not the enforceability of foreign judgments can be usefully
represented by one of game theory's paradigmatic games depends on the values that are attached to the assorted costs and
benefits of enforcement. The precise numbers are difficult to
ascertain when the player is a country, rather than a company,
and the relevant payoff is the country's interest, rather than
profit. This is because a country's interest comprises a multitude of considerations, many of which are not readily measured. Even when they can be measured, moreover, many of the
costs cannot be translated into a common metric. Below are two
plausible characterizations of the relevant costs and benefits.
While each characterization suggests that enforceability fits a
different strategic game-the "prisoner's dilemma" and the
"stag hunt"--the difficulty of establishing which set of values
better reflects reality is not problematic for present purposes
because both games lead to the conclusion that it is in the parochial interests of the United States to enforce simple foreign
judgments.
First, consider the costs of enforcing foreign judgments
from the perspective of the United States. There are adminisDOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 9-14 (1994). It is not

structurally incompatible with game theory's assumptions to analyze payoff as
if the player is at least somewhat "other regarding" and even to go so far as to
count altruism as generating a benefit for the altruistic player, such that the
value of its payoff turns in part on the welfare of other players. Game theorists, however, typically do not analyze payoffs in this way. See, e.g., ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 3 (1984) (studying behavior
among "egoists" who consider only their parochial interests); SCHELLING, supra note 98 (assuming that players' interests are wholly parochial).
114. Different conclusions emerge with regard to un-American judgments.
See supra Part I.
115. This is because game theory proceeds by identifying the "payoffs" that
are enjoyed by the players when they elect different strategies, where each
player's payoff is a function of both her and the other party's strategy.
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trative costs of using judicial resources for purposes of enforcement. There might be additional costs if the law underlying the
foreign judgment reflects policy considerations not shared by
the United States, though such costs would be difficult to quantify. If the party against which enforcement is sought is a U.S.
citizen, as frequently is the case, enforcement will result in a
diminution of the citizen's wealth, which will have some negative trickle-down effects on the U.S. economy. Other potential
costs are subtle. 116 Enforcing a foreign judgment makes foreign
regulations more efficacious by eliminating the regulationevading tactic of strategically keeping assets out of the regulating jurisdiction and ignoring its laws in reliance on the regulating country's inability to enforce its judgments. Making foreign
laws efficacious means that American companies will have to
absorb the transaction costs of conforming their behavior to different countries' laws, and such costs reduce net American
wealth. Moreover, multiple countries' different rules sometimes
might impose inconsistent obligations on American companies,
creating legal uncertainty.
Next, consider the benefits the United States receives from
having U.S. judgments enforced by foreign countries. Enforcement closes off the strategy of evasion mentioned above, increasing the efficacy of U.S. law. Enforcement also means that
wronged U.S. citizens can collect judgments awarded against
parties with assets outside the United States. Finally, and
probably most importantly, a legal regime in which countries
enforce each other's foreign judgments facilitates the conduct of
international business, which benefits the United States. If
countries did not enforce other countries' foreign judgments,
companies would be more reluctant to enter into international
dealings on account of the fact that efficacious legal recourse
would be more uncertain and costly. Companies might have to
fully litigate matters in more than one jurisdiction, and may
never successfully recover if the sued defendant shuffles its assets from country to country to avoid paying judgments.
The values that are attached to these various costs and
benefits determine the type of strategic game that is presented
by the question of whether foreign judgments should be enforced. It seems plausible to conclude that the benefits of enforcement are greater than the costs. Administrative costs are

116. See infra Part IV.D (discussing these potential costs which for the
most part have been ignored by commentators).
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relatively small, and the income loss suffered by American interests likely is much smaller than the benefits of international
business transactions that would be jeopardized under a regime
of mutual nonenforcement, given the importance of foreign
business transactions to the U.S. economy. The transaction
costs of having to comply with foreign laws may be substantial,
to be sure, but it once again is hard to believe that they would
exceed the benefits of international business. Similarly, although the "costs" of enforcing a foreign judgment that runs
against the grain of American sensibilities cannot readily be
translated to a monetary metric and hence are technically
incommensurable, 17' it seems unlikely that most Americans, if
asked to choose between them, would select the benefits of not
enforcing distasteful
foreign judgments over the benefits of for118
eign trade.

To attach some rough but indicative sample values, assume that the net benefit to one country of having its judgment
enforced is positive twelve (+12) and that the cost of enforcing a
foreign judgment is negative two (-2).1"9 For present purposes,
117. To note that a decision involves a choice between or among incommensurables is not to say that a decision is not possible. Indeed, though most difficult choices involve incommensurability-should I work more hours or play
the piano?-people make decisions under such circumstances all the time. Experience seems to bear out the hypothesis in the text above regarding the
preference for the benefits of foreign trade over the costs of enforcing distasteful foreign judgments. American courts typically invoke the specter of interrupting international business relations when they enforce foreign judgments.
See, e.g., Milhoux v. Linder, 902 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing that "increasing internationalization of commerce requires that United
States courts recognize and respect judgments entered by foreign courts").
118. Moreover, American law governing the enforcement of foreign judgments has long rejected a "reciprocity" requirement, i.e., a rule conditioning
Country A's enforcement of Country B's judgments on Country B having enforced Country A's judgments. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 52, at 1191 &
nn.6-8. The absence of such a "stick" to bring about cooperation that maximizes joint utility at first might seem puzzling under a game theoretic perspective. On further consideration, it might reflect American concern that
American refusal to enforce foreign judgments risks broadening the circumstances when foreign countries will refuse to enforce American foreign judgments, imperiling U.S. international business interests. Alternatively, it is
possible to understand the absence of a reciprocity requirement as a deviation
from game theory's predictions. In any event, such deviation would not be
relevant to this Article's analysis, which considers possible normative approaches to international relations for the purpose of highlighting the tradeoffs among incommensurable considerations that any rule governing the enforceability of un-American judgments necessarily will reflect. Trading-off is
an inherently subjective process that accordingly is "political" in nature.
119. The analysis that follows later in the text is unchanged if the benefit
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let us assume that the foreign country is faced with the same
set of incentives. 120 The resulting pattern of costs and benefits
can be graphed using standard game theoretic conventions. 121
As shown in Figure 1, the result is a standard prisoner's dilemma, where the payoffs in each cell correspond respectively
122
to the United States and then to the Foreign Country.

to a country of having its judgment enforced is deemed to be much greater
than the relative cost of enforcing the foreign country's judgment. See infra
note 122.
120. This assumption will not always hold. Some countries may value each
of the aforementioned benefits and costs differently than does the United
States. Indeed, it is plausible that the actual costs and benefits experienced by
a country are a result of factors that are specific to the country. Two countries
do not have to value the costs and benefits in the same absolute terms, however, for an interaction to be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma; what matters is
the relationship between costs and benefits from the perspective of each country. As long as they bear the relationship identified below, see infra note 122,
the interactions of the two countries can be modeled as a prisoner's dilemma.
Countries akin to the United States, such as other liberal democracies like
England and France, are more likely to experience the costs and benefits of
enforcing foreign judgments in roughly the same proportion as does the United
States. The conclusions in the text above do not hold, however, with respect to
countries that experience the benefits and costs of enforcing foreign judgments
in proportions that do not satisfy the criteria that establish a prisoner's dilemma. Such asymmetric costs and benefits across players complicate game
theory generally, not only in the enforcement of foreign judgments context. Interactions under conditions of such asymmetric costs and benefits can be modeled, though they may not fit the standard games. Whether such asymmetric
costs are the rule or the exception in the context of enforcing foreign judgments ultimately is an empirical question that is beyond this Article's scope.
121. Enforcing foreign judgments is appropriately modeled as a bilateral,
rather than a multilateral, game. The strategy incentives can be analyzed by
reference to pair-wise interactions between states, rather than multilateral
interactions in which the way Country A acts towards Country B effects Country A's relations to all other countries, because both the benefits of cooperation
and the threat of retaliation are divisible. Cf. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note
98, at 1154-55 (noting the bilateral/multilateral distinction). This bilateral
character is what makes it possible for a country to have a general approach to
the enforcement of foreign judgments. This could change, however, if, for example, a treaty conditioned its members' enforcement of a country's foreign
judgments on that country's enforcement of the foreign judgments of all members.
122. Axelrod defines a prisoner's dilemma as a game that satisfies the following conditions: (1) if both players cooperate they get the reward, R; (2) if
they both defect they get the punishment, P; (3) if one cooperates and the
other defects, the first gets sucker's payoff, S, and the other gets the temptation, T; and (4) T>R>P>S and R>(T+S)/2. AXELROD, supra note 113, at 206.
Thus, even if a significantly greater payoff value were assigned to the benefit
of enforcement, for example 100, the result would still be a prisoner's dilemma, for example 102>100>0>(-2) and 100>50.

20041

UN-AMERICAN JUDGMENTS

807

Figure 1: Prisoner'sDilemma
Foreign Country
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judgment

judgment
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-2, 12
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z

foreign judgment

Payoffs: United States, Foreign Country

If this game were played only once, game theory predicts
that both players would "defect" and choose not to enforce the
other country's judgment. 123 This outcome would not be Paretooptimal because there is an alternative set of strategies- 24
mutual enforcement-that could make both players better off. 1
Whereas each player gets a payoff of zero (0) under mutual
123. Reciprocal defection is both a dominant strategy and a Nash equilibrium. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 113, at 11 (defining strictly dominant
strategies); id. at 33-34 (explaining why each player in a prisoner's dilemma
has a strictly dominant strategy that leads to suboptimal outcomes); id. at 21
(defining Nash equilibrium as a situation where each player selects a strategy
that is the best response to all of the possible strategies available to the other
player).
The analysis in the above text, which takes the form of a "normal form
game," might be thought to problematically simplify the decision-making process with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments. After all, the players
typically do not make simultaneous decisions, but rather sequentially decide
whether to enforce the other country's judgment. As such, one might think
that enforcement of foreign judgments is more properly modeled as an "extensive form game" rather than a "normal form game." See id. at 50 (noting that
normal form games model simultaneous decision making whereas extensive
form games model sequential decision making). Simplifying the analysis by
using a normal form game is not problematic, however, because enforcement
questions are best modeled as a "supergame"-that is, a game that is either
repeated infinitely or repeated such that the players do not know when it will
end-and the sequence in which the players move is not important in a supergame since the expected payoff value is the sum of a large number of interactions. See id. at 167. Additionally, sequencing is not important because numerous cases concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments are likely
pending simultaneously. For these reasons, the enforcement of foreign judgments can be modeled as a normal form game, as is done above in the text.
124. See id. at 311 ("A solution to a game is Pareto-optimal if there is no
other combination of strategies in which one of the players is better off and the
other players are no worse off.").
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nonenforcement, each would enjoy a payoff of ten (10) under
mutual enforcement. 2 5 In other words, this model suggests that
it is in the United States's parochial interests to enforce foreign
judgments, assuming that this would create a situation in
which the foreign country also enforced U.S. judgments. Stated
differently, from the vantage point of pure self-interest, cooperation is superior to the noncooperative outcome of mutual
nonenforcement.
The question of whether to enforce a foreign judgment,
however, is better modeled as a repeat game, rather than a single-play game, because the decision whether or not to enforce a
foreign judgment is presented to a country not just one time,
but recurringly. 2 1 Unlike a single-play prisoner's dilemma, cooperation may naturally emerge in a repeat game. 27 Even under circumstances of repetition, however, cooperative outcomes
leading
to a Pareto-optimal result often will not arise on their
528
own. "[RIepeated play allows virtually any payoff to be an
equilibrium outcome, " "' even a suboptimal one.2 °
Interventions such as pre-play communication for the purpose of making mutual cooperation a focal point, however, can
125. See id.
126. A game that is repeated an infinite number of times is known as a
"supergame." Id. at 167. Although most repeat games are not of infinite
length, "a game of infinite length and a game of uncertain length with a fixed
probability of ending after each period have the same structure." Id. The enforcement of foreign judgments is fairly characterized as a game in which
there is no end point that is known to the players.
127. Cooperation may occur if several conditions are met: if the players
care about the future relative to the present and if the costs of enforcing the
foreign judgment are not too high relative to the benefits of cooperation. See
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 98, at 1126. Over time, each country may
elect to enforce the other's judgments. Even under such conditions, however,
cooperation is not assured. See infra note 128.
128. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 113, at 172-73. This is the conclusion of
so-called "folk theorems." See id. at 172. Although "repetition itself creates the
possibility of cooperative behavior," id. at 174, mutually beneficial results are
not guaranteed. See id. at 169-74. For a full discussion of folk theorems, see
DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 150 (1991) ("The 'folk theorems' for repeated games assert that if the players are sufficiently patient
then any feasible, individually rational payoffs can be enforced by an equilibrium. Thus, in the limit of extreme patience, repeated play allows virtually
any payoff to be an equilibrium outcome."). See also id. at 160 (stating that
folk theorems undermine the conclusion that players in repeat games can be
expected to "coordinate on efficient equilibria" and that "cooperation is particularly likely in repeated games").
129. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 128, at 150.
130. See id. at 150, 160.
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bring about the cooperative solution in repeat prisoner's dilemmas.' Formal agreements between countries and multilateral treaties are two possible interventions. 132e
difficult to imagine effective interventions that could be generated
by courts, though an international analogue of a restatement of
the law might suffice.' 33 To the extent that judicial tools are less
efficacious than those generated by the executive and legislative branches, game theory accordingly provides an argument
in favor of executive and legislative involvement in setting enforcement policies.3
2. Foreign Judgments and the Stag Hunt
The analysis above assumed that the full measure of benefit would be enjoyed even if one of the parties did not enforce a
foreign judgment. A more realistic model, however, might disaggregate the benefits of enforcement. While some benefits
likely would accrue to the United States if the Foreign Country
enforced a U.S. judgment while the United States did not enforce the foreign judgments, other benefits-most notably the
131. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 113, at 39-41. Both parties still would have
an incentive to defect, however, in a single-play prisoner's dilemma. Although
payoffs can be altered by enforceable contractual obligations, enforcement of
international obligations is notoriously difficult.
132. There are two reasons why the international legal system's weak enforcement system does not undermine the conclusion that treaties and agreements can be useful for this purpose. First, even absent any sense of obligation, the process of negotiation can be the equivalent of "cheap talk" that,
while not formally binding, provides both parties with information as to how
the other is likely to act, i.e., cooperatively, and hence makes each party's decision to cooperate more likely. See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap
Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 112-17 (1996) (providing a formal model to explain why cheap talk can bring about Pareto-optimal outcomes, but noting
that cheap talk will not necessarily have this effect); Richard H. McAdams, A
Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658 (2000) (noting social experiments that show that cheap talk can facilitate coordination).
Second, agreements and treaties may indeed affect behavior. Although it
might be difficult to obtain formal sanctions for breaches of international obligations, the reputational costs of violating international obligations may induce a country to "comply with its international obligation even when it would
not have done so in the absence of that obligation." Guzman, supra note 100,
at 1848. See generally id. at 1844-48 (providing a game theoretical analysis
that suggests how reputation costs can influence country behavior).
133. Though not even technically binding (in contrast with public international law, which simply has a weak enforcement mechanism), a restatement
could function as "cheap talk." See supra note 132.
134. On the other hand, the pattern of mutual enforcement of foreign
judgments that has developed under international law might be said to be an
instance where the Pareto-optimal solution has arisen naturally on its own.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 88:783

facilitation of international business-might be present only if
both countries typically enforce judgments over time.
Therefore, assume the following: the cost of enforcing a foreign
judgment remains negative two (-2); the benefit accruing to the
United States even if the United States does not enforce the
foreign judgment, B1, is positive five (+5); and the benefit representing additional incremental benefit enjoyed by the United
States only if it also enforces the other country's foreign judgment, B2, is positive seven (+7).136 Assume as well that the
other country has symmetrical payoffs.'37 The results can be
graphically depicted as follows:
Figure2: Stag Hunt
Foreign Country

c
co
.t

Enforce U.S.

Don't enforce U.S.

judgment

judgment

10, 10

-2, 5

5, -2

0, 0

Enforce foreign
judgment
Don't enforce

foreign judgment
Payoffs: United States, Foreign Country

This method of modeling the costs and benefits generates
the so-called stag hunt paradigm. 3 1 Whereas Country A's inter135. I say "over time" because it is unlikely that a one-time deviation would
eliminate the benefit.
136. The analysis in the text above simplifies matters somewhat. In a
world such as ours where there currently is a norm of enforcement, it is
unlikely that a one-shot decision not to enforce would immediately destroy international business. The present cost of not enforcing a judgment would be
the probability that not enforcing would lead to the unraveling of the international business system multiplied by the cost to the United States of such an
outcome. The product then would be discounted to account for the fact that
such costs would come in the future. In short, TOTAL COST = p(C)O, where
p = probability, C = cost, and e = discount factor.
137. But see supra note 120 (noting that such an assumption may not be
consistent with reality, where payoffs may vary).
138. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 113, at 35-41. The stag hunt, like the
prisoner's dilemma, is associated with a paradigmatic story. Id. at 35. There
are two hunters, and each must decide to hunt either stag or hare. Id. They
can catch a stag together only if both elect to hunt stag, but each alone can
only successfully hunt hare. Id. at 35-36. It is better to share a stag than to
bag only a hare. Id. at 36. The payoffs above correspond to this story.
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ests are maximized in the prisoner's dilemma when Country B
enforces Country A's foreign judgments but Country A does not
enforce Country B's judgments, Country A's interests in a stag
hunt are maximized when both countries enforce the other's
foreign judgments. If Country B does not enforce Country A's
judgments, however, Country A is better off if it does not enforce Country B's judgments, either.
The stag hunt, like the prisoner's dilemma, suggests that
mutual enforcement of the other's foreign judgments is in each
country's parochial interests. The single-play stag hunt has two
Nash equilibria, however, and will not reliably yield the Paretooptimal result of mutual enforcement.139 Furthermore, as with
the prisoner's dilemma, it can be shown that a repeat stag hunt
does not ensure a cooperative solution. 4 ° As is true with repeat
prisoner's dilemmas, however, external interventions such as
treaties and bilateral agreements can provide the necessary
push to secure the mutually beneficial cooperative outcome of
reciprocal enforcement. As we will see below in Part IV, however, game theory yields a different analysis as regards the enforcement of un-American judgments.
C. RAWLS'S THE LAW OF PEOPLES

141

Rawlsian political theory yields a very different approach
to foreign relations generally, as well as to the enforcement of
foreign judgments, than does game theory. What follows in this
section is an explication of Rawls's general approach and its
application to the enforcement of simple foreign judgments.

139. The stag hunt's two Nash equilibria are: (1) both hunt stag (here, enforce the other country's judgments) and (2) both hunt hare (here, do not enforce the other country's judgments). See id. at 36. If Player A hunts stag,
Player B's best strategy is to hunt stag, meaning that both players hunting
stag is one Nash equilibrium. See id. Similarly, if Player A hunts hare then
Player B's best strategy is also to hunt hare, meaning that hunting hare also
is a Nash equilibrium. See id. For a discussion of Nash equilibria, see id. at 21.
See also supra note 123.
140. See supra note 128. The Pareto-optimal solution is not assured because there are multiple Nash equilibria, and Pareto-optimality relies on a
strict punishment strategy that may not be credible. See BAIRD ET AL., supra
note 113, at 173 (noting that "[tihe threat of the severe punishment needed to
support the Pareto-optimal equilibria may not be credible. Parties may not
find it in their self-interest to carry out severe punishments after there has
been a deviation.").
141. RAWLS, supra note 79.
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1. Rawls's General Approach
In the essay The Law of Peoples, John Rawls seeks to identify fair terms of international relations, which he dubs the
"Law of Peoples." 42 As he did in his domestic account of justice,
Rawls uses a social contract methodology based on an "original
position" to determine the fair terms of international relations. 4 3 In the domestic case, parties in the original position
represent an individual citizen, and they "do not know the social position, or the conception of the good (its particular aims
and attachments), or the realized abilities and psychological
" 144
propensities, and much else, of the persons they represent.
In the international case, parties in the "second original position"14 represent not citizens but peoples, and they do not know
"the size of the territory, or the population, or the relative
strength of the people whose fundamental interests they represent."45 In both the domestic and international cases, the original position's veil of ignorance is the key to enabling people to
conceptually transcend their self-interest so as to identify just
institutions. A person in an original position will treat every
citizen in the domestic case (or every "peoples" in the international case) fairly because she does not know whom she represents and accordingly will not choose political14institutions
that
7
unfairly treat whomever she might represent.
To understand fully the principles of international intercourse that Rawls derives via the second original position, it is
necessary to be clear about the entities that are represented in
the second original position: "peoples." 148 "Peoples," for Rawls,
142. See id. at 3.
143. See id. at 30 (noting the social contractarian nature of his analysis).
144. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 305 (1993).
145. See RAWLS, supra note 79, at 32. Rawls evidently dubs this the "second" original position only because he first utilized the original position to deduce domestic principles of justice. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 30-33. To treat an individual (or peoples) fairly does not
mean that every individual (or peoples) will be allowed to do whatever she
wishes. Any allowable constraints, however, will be fair insofar as a person in
the original (or second original) position would think it fair to impose such
limitations. Furthermore, the mere fact that an individual (or peoples) is excluded from the original (or second original) position does not mean that her
interests will be wholly disregarded. Rawls concludes, for example, that people
in the original position would take account of those societies not represented
in the second original position, i.e., burdened societies, outlaw states, and benevolent absolutisms. See, e.g., id. at 89-91.
148. Id. at 23.
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refers to groups of individuals who are (1) united by "common
sympathies" and (2) who act through their government. "9 By
"common sympathies," Rawls appears to be referring to common language, history, race, religion, or shared territory that
unites a group of persons so that they feel greater kinship toward one another than in respect to others. 5 ° In short, "peoples" refers to cultures that are politically organized.
Rawls's account explicitly assumes both that culture is
very important for persons and that it is important that different groups retain their different cultures. Rawls rejects the
goal of creating a single world culture and world government,
explicitly stating that protecting different peoples' cultures is
important.' 5' According to Rawls, "It is surely, ceteris paribus,a
good for individuals and associations to be attached to their
particular culture and to take part in its common public and
civic life. In this way political society is expressed and fulfilled. 152
Rawls does not explain why the preservation of diverse cultures is important, 153 though he approvingly refers to several
noted political philosophers who do.154 The notion is that a per-

149. Id.
150. See id. To be sure, Rawls does not say much directly about what he
means by "common sympathies." He cites to John Stuart Mill's Considerations
on Representative Government, which uses the phrase "common sympathies,"
but this reference to Mill is only tentative. Rawls states that "[alt this initial
stage, I use the first sentences of [Mill's] in which he uses an idea of nationality to describe a people's culture." See id. at 23 n.17. Rawls extensively quotes
Mill at this point, however. See id. Elsewhere, Rawls refers approvingly to
Yael Tamir's Liberal Nationalism and the idea of nation as a "pattern of cultural values," see id. at 25 n.20, and to Michael Walzer's defense of limits on
immigration as a way of protecting "political culture," see id. at 39 n.48.
151. See id. at 61; see also id. at 40 ("If a reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is a basic feature of a constitutional democracy with its free
institutions, we may assume that there is an even greater diversity in the
comprehensive doctrines affirmed among the members of the Society of Peoples with its many different cultures and traditions.").
152. See id. at 61. Though I do not intend to pursue the point here, there
appears to be a tension between the understandings of human needs that
Rawls utilizes in the domestic and international cases. More specifically,
Rawls's approach in The Law of Peoples appears to reflect a thicker understanding of personhood.
153. The closest he seems to come is with his assertion that not accommodating other cultures is to deny respect to members of the culture, and that
undermining the cultures of "decent nonliberal peoples" is to deny the "due
measure of respect" that they are owed by liberal people. Id. at 61.
154. See id. at 65-78.
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son's culture is an important aspect of her personal identity.' 55
Culture provides the "set of values that serve as criteria for
evaluation" that are a prerequisite to moral reflection and the
making of meaningful choices."5 This is not to say that people
are wholly culturally determined, or that people are without
the power to critically analyze, and to even reject, their culture. A person's particular culture, however, provides the
starting point for such critical analysis. For that reason, preserving the individual's distinctive culture is deeply important.
To be clear, Rawls's analysis does not lead to the conclusion that the Law of Peoples requires that all cultures should
be allowed to flourish. As in the domestic context, Rawls limits
the universe of potential participants in the second original position; only "reasonable" persons may participate in the first
original position,"' and only "liberal" and "decent hierarchical
peoples" may participate in the second original position. 16' De155. YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 7 (1993) (stating that "[b]eing
situated" in a culture is one of the "preconditions of personal [identity]" for individuals).
156. Id. at 22 ("Reflecting on issues concerning moral identity is dependent
on the presence of a cultural context."). For a similar account, see WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 83-84 (1995) (arguing that "freedom involves making choices amongst
various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but
also makes them meaningful to us"). See also id. at 83 ("People make choices
about the social practices around them, based on their beliefs about the values
of these practices .... And to have a belief about the value of a practice is, in

the first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by
our culture."); Mark D. Rosen, "Illiberal"Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and
American Constitutionalism,12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2002).
157. See TAMIR, supra note 155, at 25. The view that persons steeped in
their particular cultures nonetheless are capable of undergoing radical personal transformations that remake their moral or national identities is what
makes Tamir's account firmly liberal. See id. at 23. Other thinkers disagree,
arguing that not all aspects of a person are subject to critical revision. See,
e.g., 1 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND
LANGUAGE 34-35 (1985) (arguing that certain evaluations are "inseparable
from ourselves as agents"); see also Michael J. Sandel, Book Review, 107
HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1768 (1994) (arguing that people can "sometimes be obligated to fulfill certain ends we have not chosen-ends given... by our identities as members of families, peoples, cultures, or traditions").
158. TAMIR, supra note 155, at 22-25.
159. RAWLS, supra note 144, at 29-30; see also Mark D. Rosen, The Outer
Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country:A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REv. 1053, 1120 (1998).
160. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 32-34 (liberal peoples); id. at 63 (decent hierarchical peoples). Rawls explicitly notes this relation between reasonableness (in the domestic case) and liberal and decent hierarchical peoples (in the
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termining the potential participants is crucial to determining
the content of the Law of Peoples, for persons in the second
original position will not protect the interests of those whom
there is no possibility they might represent as carefully as they
will protect their own.
We now are in a position to appreciate the principles of international intercourse that, according to Rawls, people in the
second original position would select.16 ' The first principle is
that "[p]eoples are free and independent, and their freedom and
independence are to be respected by other peoples.' 6' This is
because "no people organized by its government is prepared to
count, as a first principle, the benefits for another people as
outweighing the hardships imposed on itself. Well-ordered peoples insist on an equality among themselves as peoples ..... 6 3
Given Rawls's view of the importance of culture, this equality
principle is sensible. Not knowing which peoples they in fact
represent, and aware of culture's importance, "the representatives of peoples will want to preserve the equality and independence of their own society."' ' For these same reasons, persons in the second original position also would select
a strong
65
(but not categorical) principle of nonintervention.
2. Application to Foreign Judgments
The principles of equality and nonintervention provide
guidance to analyzing the question of whether foreign judgments should be enforced.'66 Imagine that a judgment issued
international case). See id. For a formal definition of "decent hierarchical peoples," see id. at 64-67. For Rawls, decent hierarchical peoples respect basic
human rights and are willing to live peacefully with other peoples, but they
treat citizens within their polity not as individuals but as members of groups
and do not give equal treatment to all groups. Id. at 64-66, 68-71.
161. See id. at 37-41.
162. Id. at 37.
163. Id. at 40.
164. Id. at 41.
165. Id. at 37.
166. See id. at 86 (stating that the "Law of Peoples is thus reasonably complete," meaning that "it can be extended to give principles for all politically
relevant subjects .... There is no relevant subject, politically speaking, for

which we lack principles and standards to judge."). To be sure, Rawls's short
essay does not explicitly deal with the issue of foreign judgments, or for that
matter, most other specific issues. See id. Indeed, Rawls acknowledges that
the principles he identifies "require much explanation and interpretation." Id.
The principles are to be elaborated from the vantage point of the second original position. Id. at 37. This is sensible; if the hermeneutic device of the second
original position is a fair and illuminating method for identifying the broad
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from a court in Country I (the Issuing jurisdiction) and that a
court in Country E (the Enforcing jurisdiction) has been asked
to enforce the judgment. The principle of equality suggests the
following: if nonenforcement would threaten Country I's culture, and enforcement does not pose a risk to Country E's culture, then Country E should enforce Country I's foreign judgment. To conclude otherwise would be to say that persons in
the second original position would select a Law of Peoples that
unnecessarily threatened the culture of a people they might
represent. Given the importance of culture, persons in the second original position would not make such a decision. Instead,
the principle of equality suggests that they would select what
might be termed a "culture-preserving" rule with regard to the
enforcement of foreign judgments.167
A further implication of the principle of equality is that
there should not be a "reciprocity" requirement that conditions
Country A's enforcement of Country B's judgments on Country
B's enforcement of Country A's judgments. 68 The risks of enforcing another country's judgments are undoubtedly culture
specific, turning on such variables as the fragility of the enforcing country's culture and the way that judicial acts are conceptualized by the enforcing country's citizens. 69 The Law of Peoprinciples of inter-peoples interaction, it follows that it also is suitable for
specifying the principles' detailed applications.
167. The term "culture-preserving" is my own. It is not intended to suggest
that cultures are stagnant, but only to suggest that people in the second original position would not select international rules under which cultural change
of one peoples was the result of the actions of other peoples. To be sure, significant aspects of many of today's cultures can be said to be the result of persecutions and other such forces whose origins are outside the given culture.
Because many persecuted cultures have disappeared over time, it seems reasonable to posit that persons in the second original position, knowing this,
would not wish to put their own cultures at risk. Furthermore, even with regard to those cultures (such as Jewish, Armenian, and gypsy cultures) that
have survived, such persecutions are not typically conceptualized by the resulting culture as having been beneficial, notwithstanding the fact that they
importantly shaped that culture. For an informative account of the dynamics
of cultural development, see SELYA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE:
EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA (2002).
168. The Law of Peoples thus gives rise to a rule that is consistent with
contemporary American law, which does not have a reciprocity requirement.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Whereas early U.S. case law imposed a "reciprocity" requirement that conditioned U.S. enforcement on past
enforcement of U.S. judgments by the issuing country, virtually all American
jurisdictions have since rejected this reciprocity requirement. See SCOLES ET
AL., supra note 52, at 1191 nn.6-8.
169. With regard to the latter, consider the cultural consequences of en-
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ples accordingly suggests that Country E should enforce Country I's judgment whereas Country C should not enforce the
identical judgment from Country I if enforcing the judgment
would not damage Country E's culture but would devastate
Country C's culture. The Law of Peoples would not include a
reciprocity requirement because a person in the second original
position, not knowing what people she represented, would
choose a legal regime that was maximally protective of different liberal and decent hierarchical cultures, for she would not
risk selecting a rule that unnecessarily threatened the people
she might represent.
The analysis so far has assumed zero cultural costs for
Country E if the judgment is enforced and some cultural costs
for Country I if the judgment is not enforced. Most of the time,
however, deciding whether to enforce a foreign judgment presents a more difficult choice. Very often, there will be some cultural costs to Country E of enforcing Country I's judgment.17 A
Rawlsian analysis suggests there should be an accounting of
how the enforcing court's decision would impact the cultures of
both the enforcing country, Country E, and the issuing country,
Country I-what choice of law scholars call a "multilateralist"
approach. 71 (By contrast, a "unilateralist" approach analyzes
solely from the perspective of the jurisdiction that is making
the juridical determination.) 172 The person in the second original position, who by definition does not know the people she
forcement in a culture where acts of the judiciary were understood as government approval of the adjudicated right. The cultural consequences of enforcing
a foreign judgment would be very different if enforcement were simply viewed
as being the task of courts, and not as government endorsement of the legal
right that was being judicially enforced. For a suggestion that this might describe the way that American judicial action is popularly understood, see infra
note 283 and accompanying text.
170. This certainly is the case with regard to un-American judgments, and
it is true with many simple foreign judgments, as well.
171. See Dodge, supra note 91, at 107-10 (providing a helpful discussion of
the distinction between unilateralist and mulilateralist approaches to choice of
law). The public policy exception, as currently understood, is an example of a
unilateralist approach, insofar as it asks only whether enforcement of a foreign judgment would be contrary to American policy without considering the
impact on the foreign country. See supra Part I.A. As a matter of positive law,
the contemporary enforcements doctrine accordingly varies from a Rawlsian
approach in this respect. The variation does not undermine this Article's use of
Rawls's insight, as this Article is directed at developing a normative account to
highlight the value-laden assumptions that are built into contemporary doctrines.
172. Dodge, supra note 91, at 107.
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represents, would select a regime under which the enforcing
court would be required to assess the cultural costs to the enforcing country and the costs to the issuing country of not enforcing the judgment, and to choose the outcome that minimizes the cultural cost. This would protect cultures in a
manner that would not systematically disadvantage any particular culture. Persons in the second original position would
choose this culture-preserving rule because they would be
averse to selecting a rule that unnecessarily put either a liberal
or decent hierarchical culture at risk, lest they end up representing a people from that culture. 173 As will be explained below, the fact that only liberal and decent hierarchical cultures
need to be protected is the source of important substantive
limitations on what foreign judgments can be enforced. 74
The analysis to be made under a Rawlsian approach is
similar to that found in the domestic choice of law doctrine
known as "comparative impairment. , 175 Under comparative im-

pairment, courts apply the law of the jurisdiction whose interests would be most adversely affected if its law is not applied. 76
I will refer to its international cousin, which focuses on the enforcement of judgments rather than choice of law, as "international comparative impairment."'77
Comparative impairment has been subject to numerous
critiques that it is unworkable.' The same challenges could be
173. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. In one important sense,
Rawlsian analysis calls for an approach completely at odds with traditional
public policy analysis. Public policy justifies refusing enforcement of judgments based on laws that run up against our most important public policies,
while Rawlsian analysis would not-insofar as such fundamental policies are
robust and not at risk.
174. See infra Part IV.C.3.
175. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963) (providing the classic statement of comparative impairment).
176. Id.
177. For an example of a court taking this approach outside the enforcement context, see Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d
1512, 1521 (11th Cir. 1994), where the Eleventh Circuit, deciding to abstain
pending the conclusion of German litigation, assessed "the relative strengths
of the American and German interests" and noted that "the public interest in
the litigation is more conspicuous" in Germany than in the United States.
178. See, e.g., William H. Allen & Erin A. O'Hara, Second GenerationLaw
and Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter's Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1011, 1027-40 (1999); Leo Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1978); Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impair-

2004]

UN-AMERICAN JUDGMENTS

819

carried over mutatis mutandis to international comparative
impairment. There are two major concerns: (1) whether the enforcing country can ascertain the potential cultural costs to the
issuing country of not enforcing; and (2) even if the enforcing
country can ascertain those costs, what should be done when,
as usually will be the case, the domestic and foreign costs are
incommensurable. In other words, how can it be determined
which cultural cost is "greater" if the cultural interests are not
capable of being measured by a common metric that captures
everything that matters about the two options?'79
At this point it is crucial to differentiate among the different branches of government. The above challenges primarily
address judicial competency. The legislative and executive
branches, by contrast, have tools and competencies that permit
them to undertake such analysis. One of the foremost tools is
negotiation with other countries, particularly during the process of negotiating treaties or executive agreements. The negotiation context is well suited both for enabling the federal executive to ascertain the interests of the other country and for
creating compromises that reflect the negotiating parties'
shared sense of what constitutes fair outcomes on an ex ante
ment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the CaliforniaExperience, 68
CAL. L. REV. 576, 604-17 (1980); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 316-18 (1990).
179. See Kramer, supra note 178, at 316-18 (distilling the various critiques
of comparative impairment to these two principles). Kanowitz criticizes
comparative impairment for asking courts to make essentially political judgments. See Kanowitz, supra note 178, at 257-59. This is best understood as an
undifferentiated argument that courts are unable to successfully accomplish
the two analytical tasks described above in the text. Kay's argument, as well
as that of Allen and O'Hara, is that comparative analysis is too complex for
courts to successfully undertake. See Allen & O'Hara, supra note 178, at 103133; Kay, supra note 178, at 586. Allen and O'Hara advance the analysis by
providing a new theoretical reason-the interaction of bundling and depelage-as to why comparative impairment might be too complex. See Allen &
O'Hara, supra note 178, at 1033-37. They argue that "[sitates can use differing bundles of mechanisms to produce a given ex ante behavioral incentive."
Id. at 1036. Accordingly, one can misunderstand the state's true policy if one
analyzes only one strand of the bundle of incentives. Id. This is best understood as an argument concerning the difficulties of assessing state policy, and
it holds in the purely domestic situation as well. Furthermore, while it identifies a common trap, it does not establish that courts are a priori incapable of
ascertaining state policy. Accordingly, this interesting argument of Allen and
O'Hara is best understood as an aspect of the first challenge to comparative
impairment concerning courts' abilities to ascertain the policy behind laws.
Their argument strikes a useful cautionary note, but does not establish that
comparative impairment is presumptively unworkable.
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basis 180
The executive and legislative branches are better suited to
making the determinations called for by international comparative impairment outside the negotiation context as well. To
understand why, it first is necessary to refine the concept of incommensurability. When goods are commensurable, there are
clear-cut choices among them that all rational actors would
agree upon; a single five-dollar bill readily can be evaluated in
relation to three one-dollar bills, and everyone would agree
that, in the ordinary case,' the former is more valuable than
the latter. 8 2 Incommensurability, by contrast, concerns the
choice between (or among) options that cannot be reduced to a
single metric that captures everything that matters about the
options and that thereby permits comparisons with which all

180. This Article provides several considerations that suggest the wisdom
of resolving enforcement questions through treaty making or executive agreements. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386-87 (2003) (explaining the president's power to make "executive agreements"). This Article
does not, however, provide a comprehensive analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of each of the potential law-making institutions, i.e., the judiciary,
the executive, and the legislature, vis-A-vis the likelihood of generating a good
solution with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments. Neil Komesar
has argued that such "comparative institutional analysis" is a necessary prerequisite to determining which institution should be entrusted with lawmaking responsibility, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001), and this strikes me as indis-

putably correct. While space limitations preclude me from undertaking a fullblown analysis of the desirability of treaties or executive agreements in this
context, this Article does at least identify some important considerations that
is in their favor.
Parenthetically, it is not the case that such "comparative institutional
analysis" with regard to the enforcement of foreign judgments would run afoul
of the Constitution, for there is no constitutional requirement that the political
branches negotiate a treaty or create an executive agreement concerning foreign judgments. In the absence of a treaty or executive agreement, enforcement determinations typically fall to the courts. Accordingly, a comparative
institutional analysis is fully relevant to asking whether it makes sense, as a
policy matter, to embark on a treaty or executive agreement, or to leave things
as they are now.
181. This excludes, for instance, a dollar bill that has been signed by a celebrity.
182. Cf Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1412-15 (2001) (speaking of the
incontestable goal of "maximizing" when deciding among commensurable matters); id. at 1428-29 ("[Ihf there is only one value that ultimately matters, then
rationality will compel a practical decision maker to seek and choose the option that will realize the most of that value. From this view, practical reason is
entirely a matter of calculation.").
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rational actors would agree.18 3 Incommensurability generally

describes the arena of choice in which subjective evaluations
must be made. The choice among incommensurables is a process of prioritizing competing commitments. As such, it can well

be understood as defining the very character of the person or
polity that is making the decision."" These are the sort of value

judgments that form the core of political decision making, and
they accordingly most properly fall within the domain of the
legislative and executive branches.' For this reason, the presence of technically incommensurable considerations is not a

challenge to legislative or executive utilization of the method of
international comparative impairment. Just the opposite: the
inevitable presence of incommensurability problems in the
arena of enforceability is a strong argument that the decision of
whether to enforce foreign judgments is most appropriately
made by the more political branches of government rather than

courts.
Even with respect to courts, however, the above challenges
to international comparative impairment may not be devastat-

ing. Virtually identical analytical difficulties attend domestic

183. See,

e.g.,

Joseph

Raz,

Incommensurability and Agency,

in

INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 110 (Ruth

Chang ed., 1997) ("Incommensurability is the absence of a common measure.");
Scharffs, supra note 182, at 1390 (stating that incommensurability arises
when "everything that matters about two competing options" cannot "be expressed in terms of a common values"). Some commentators have used the
term "incomparability" for the absence of a common metric. See Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL
REASON, supra, at 1-4. Other commentators have argued that "incom-

mensurability" and "comparability" appropriately have two very different
meanings. See, e.g., Scharffs, supra note 182, at 1390-94.

184. For similar accounts of incommensurability, see Elijah Millgram,
Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 183, at 151-69 (focusing on individual decision making under circumstances of incommensurability); Raz, supra note 183, at 110-28 (arguing that choice, not rationality, governs the selection among incommensurables); Charles Taylor, Leading a Life,
in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra
note 183, at 170-83 (stating that justified choice among incomparables can be
made by analyzing how the competing goods fit within the "shape" of a person's life). For an instructive general account of incommensurability, see Richard Warner, Does IncommensurabilityMatter? Incommensurability and Public
Policy, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1287 (1998).
185. This is not to suggest that the legislative and executive branches are
identically situated with regard to making political decisions as far as democratic theory and American constitutionalism are concerned, only that they are
more institutionally suited to such decision making than courts.
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legal analysis, and courts nevertheless render judgments. Consider the first challenge. Courts very frequently engage in purposive interpretation that requires that they ascertain the interests served by various laws.'86 Asking a court to ascertain
the cultural costs of not enforcing a judgment is akin to this determination; it involves assessing the value served by the law
and the likely consequences of nonenforcement of the law.
Surely, it may be more difficult to ascertain the interests that
are served by a foreign law, but the difference is one of degree
rather than kind.8 7 Moreover, sometimes it may not be difficult
at all to determine the foreign interests that are served by a
particular foreign law.
Consider next the issue of incommensurability. American
courts are asked all the time to "balance" interests that are not
analytically commensurable. What does it mean, for example,
for a court under the doctrine of procedural due process to balance the potential deprivation suffered by a citizen against the
government's interests in administrative ease and fiscal savings?1 88 These considerations are not reducible to a common
metric and hence are incapable of being technically commensurated. If and how such incommensurables can be "weighed"
against one another, "balanced" against each other and the like
are hotly contested jurisprudential questions that I cannot hope
to definitively answer here.'8 9 Nonetheless, regardless of
whether we can clearly explain how courts solve incommensurability problems, it is clear that they do it all the time
in the domestic context.8 0 That being so, it might be argued
186. See Kramer, supra note 178, at 292-94.
187. Furthermore, the difficulty of ascertaining effects on foreign cultures
likely diminishes to the extent that judges from different countries interact
with one another. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,40 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1103 (2000) (describing this phenomenon).
188. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
189. A work-in-progress considers these questions in greater detail. See
Mark D. Rosen, Incommensurability,Culture, and Constitutionalism(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For arguments that "balancing" is a
problematic metaphor for judging, see Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not
Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Scharffs, supra note 183, at 1411-17. For a contrary
approach, see Erwin Chemrinsky, A Grand Theory of ConstitutionalLaw?, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1263 (2002) (reviewing JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND
TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001)) ("Every time

the Court balances .... a value choice is being made.").
190. See Scharffs, supra note 183, at 1374 (noting that "Ij]udges routinely
seek to accomplish the impossible-to commensurate incommensurable values. That they attempt to do so with regularity says something important

2004]

UN-AMERICAN JUDGMENTS

that it is not unreasonable to believe that they can make decisions in the international context, as well.' 91
D. RAWLS VERSUS GAME THEORY: A DIFFERENCE IN BASIC
VALUES

We now are in a position to appreciate the major respect in
which Rawlsian political theory differs from game theory.
Rather than operating under a veil of ignorance, the players
under game theory are assumed to know whom they represent
and what their interests are.'92 These different starting vantage
points mean that Rawlsian theory is structured to generate
rules of interaction that all countries might deem to be fair,
whereas game theory aims to maximize the interests of parties
who know their identity. The touchstone of a game theoretic
analysis accordingly becomes U.S. parochial interests; any interest in supporting other countries' laws is purely derivative of
U.S. interests. Under a Rawlsian approach, by contrast, the
goal is to create a law of international relations that disinterested third parties would think is fair.
about the problems of incommensurability, namely that such problems do not
foreclose reasoned deliberation and choice.").
191. The process of commensurating incommensurables in the domestic
context, however, is different than in the international context. As mentioned
above, commensurating incommensurables can be usefully understood as prioritizing competing interests and, in the process, creating culture. When
American courts resolve purely domestic cases, they can be understood as
helping to construct the American culture as they harmonize incommensurable commitments. That they are engaging in such a subjective process is not
problematic insofar as they are working to define the culture of which all parties to the litigation acknowledge being a part. In the context of determining
whether foreign judgments should be enforced, however, matters are importantly different. There are multiple cultures-the American and the foreign
culture-and an American court's commensurating incommensurables in a
manner that reflects American values when deciding whether to enforce a foreign judgment could well be labeled an act of cultural hegemony.
When a court harmonizes competing incommensurable commitments, it
inevitably helps create a particular culture. Importantly, when courts confront
the question of whether to enforce a foreign judgment, the resolution they provide shapes not only domestic culture, but the international legal culture as
well. Accordingly, when courts harmonize incommensurable values in the
process of deciding whether to enforce a foreign judgment, they should keep in
mind that they are making a decision that will help construct the character of
two cultures: domestic and international. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New
Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 469, 570 n.319 (2000) (making a similar point). The obvious complexity of this process is yet one more reason why it is better undertaken by
the more political branches of government.
192. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 98, at 1155-56.
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Ultimately, the choice between a game theoretic approach
and a Rawlsian analysis boils down to this question: Should
foreign relations be determined solely on the basis of what is in
the interest of the United States, or in view of what is fairest
from the perspective of all countries? It seems unlikely that the
choice between the two is governed by logic. The choice instead
would seem to reflect value judgments about which people of
good will can disagree.9 To be clear, this Article does not take
a position on which approach is preferable. Rather, it aims to
show that resolving enforceability determinations frequently
requires recourse to ante-legal, value-laden judgments.
IV. APPLYING THE TWO FRAMEWORKS
TO UN-AMERICAN JUDGMENTS
Taking account of all potentially affected entities, this part
analyzes the enforceability of un-American judgments from
three perspectives: comity analysis, game theory, and Rawlsian
political theory. The relevance of game theory and Rawlsian political theory were explained above. 94 Comity is worth considering because it is the likely doctrine courts would turn to once
they understand that the Constitution is not a bar to the enforcement of un-American judgments,"' unless and until either
the executive or legislative branch steps in to formulate a policy
as regards the enforcement of un-American judgments. Some
parts of the comity analysis are unaffected by the analyst's
ante-legal political commitments. At many points, however,
comity is undertheorized and accordingly incapable of providing principled guidance. At these junctures, recourse must be
had to political commitments, and these ante-legal commitments are outcome determinative.
Two findings are worth highlighting from the outset. First,
game theory and Rawlsian analysis converge on a conclusion
that is at variance with American court holdings to date: both
methodologies reject the view that un-American judgments
categorically should not be enforced. Second, even under a
Rawlsian analysis, which is quite sympathetic to foreign judg193. Neither is readily reducible to the other. Though it may be argued
that pursuing fairness is in the self-interest of powerful countries, and that
failing to do so accounts for terrorism and political instability, such a claim is
factually contingent. In an effort to avoid unnecessary assumptions, this Article will treat game theory and Rawlsian theory as distinct approaches.
194. See supra Part III.A.
195. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part III).
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ments, not all un-American judgments should be enforced by
American courts.
A. FAIRNESS TO THE PARTIES

First consider the question of fairness to the litigating parties. Though this consideration already is part of ordinary comity analysis, no courts to date have undertaken the analysis
that follows due to their mistaken constitutional analysis,
which pretermitted such considerations of fairness. Fairness to
the parties also is relevant under a Rawlsian analysis, for people in the second original position would not select a regime of
enforcement that treated individual litigants unfairly.19 6 Under
the standard game theoretic approach, however, fairness to the
parties is not a relevant consideration. 9 7 The fairness analysis
that follows thus is relevant to comity and Rawlsian analysis,
but not to game theory. The fairness analysis shows that it is
almost always fair to both the winning and losing parties for an
American court to enforce un-American judgments, even if a

U.S. citizen is the losing party.
1.

The Victorious Party

If the foreign jurisdiction properly exercised adjudicatory
jurisdiction and the trial procedures were basically fair, then

the same considerations that inform domestic res judicata doctrine suggest it is fair to enforce the judgment from the perspective of the party who was victorious in the foreign court.

196. It might be objected that fairness to individuals would be irrelevant
under Rawls's account insofar as the focus of his analysis is "peoples," not individuals. As explained above, however, "peoples" and cultures are valuable
only because they are important to, and bring benefits to, individuals. See supra Part III.C. Accordingly, while people in the second original position (international) would not insist on the same thick set of protections that persons in
the original position (domestic) would, they would not choose a regime of enforcement that treated individual litigants unfairly. For discussion of the
distinction between "peoples" and individuals, see supra note 147.
197. Although it is possible to include fairness as a benefit when undertaking the cost-benefit analysis called for by game theory, this typically is not
done. See supra note 113. Under game theory, the effects of enforcement on
the parties are relevant only insofar as they affect the country. If the party
seeking enforcement is a U.S. citizen, then enforcement generates a benefit
insofar as it aids a U.S. citizen. If the party against whom enforcement is
sought is a U.S. citizen, then enforcement generates a cost to the extent enforcement may have negative trickle-down effects on the U.S. economy. If neither party is a U.S. citizen, then the parties' perspectives are of absolutely no
import to a game theoretic analysis.
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Comity doctrine and the recognition statutes specifically provide that a foreign judgment will not be enforced if the litigating court lacked adjudicatory jurisdiction or if the procedures
were not fundamentally fair.'98
While contemporary doctrine thus goes far to ensuring that
foreign judgments are enforced only when doing so would be
fair from the vantage point of the victorious party, the doctrine
omits one relevant consideration: whether the issuing jurisdiction properly had legislative jurisdiction.9 If the issuing jurisdiction did not have the power to appropriately regulate the
matter at hand, fairness to the "victorious" party does not demand that the judgment be enforced. The careful entity-byentity analysis suggested here thus already has unearthed a
relevant consideration overlooked by contemporary doctrine.
2. The Losing Party
From the perspective of the party who lost in the foreign
court, it similarly is not unfair to respect the foreign judgment
if the foreign country both had proper adjudicatory and legislative jurisdiction and also utilized fair procedures. The policies
behind res judicata are applicable here, as well: the losing
party had her day in court, and she accordingly should not be
permitted a second bite at the litigation apple. This conclusion
is most clear if the losing party herself is a citizen of the foreign
country from which the judgment issued, for there is a broad
consensus that countries are entitled to regulate their citizens
and to adjudicate their disputes.2 °° In the ordinary case--that
198. See supra Part II.A.
199. Legislative jurisdiction refers to a country's power to regulate,
whereas adjudicatory jurisdiction is the power to hale a party before its courts.
Hartford First Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the difference between legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction). A state may have personal jurisdiction but not legislative jurisdiction. See, e.g., Philllips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985).
Conversely, a state may lack personal jurisdiction but have legislative jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978). Although
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is well aware of legislative
jurisdiction, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9
(1971), its definition of a valid judgment (which under section 98 is entitled to
recognition) focuses only on judicial jurisdiction, see id. § 92 & cmt. a. Good
sense suggests that prescriptive jurisdiction also is relevant to determining
whether the issuing country's interest is valid.
200. Though there is broad consensus, there are dissenting views. For an
informative overview of arguments against inferring such regulatory power,
see Seth F. Kreimer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom...": The Right to

Travel and ExtraterritorialAbortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1993). There also
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is, unless her home country's laws are absolutely repugnant or
unless she was wrongly prevented from leaving her country-it
accordingly is fair to apply the judgment against her.
The conclusion that it is fair to hold the losing party to the
foreign judgment persists even if (1) the losing party is a citizen
of the United States and (2a) the foreign court utilized procedures that differ from constitutionally required American procedures and/or (2b) the underlying law giving rise to the right
could not have been enacted by an American government due to
the Constitution. The enforcement of such judgments is not unfair from the perspective of the losing party if the party can be
said to have consented to being governed by the foreign law.
Three questions arise: (1) Why should consent matter to determining whether it is fair to subject the losing party to the foreign judgment? (2) What are the conditions for finding consent?
(3) Are there substantive limits to the type of regulations to
which a U.S. citizen can fairly be permitted to consent? There is
no case law directly on point to answer these questions. Instead, this section considers these issues from the vantage
point of political theory and analogous areas of the law.
a. Why Consent Matters
It is not unfair to hold persons to the laws of a foreign
country if they indeed have consented to abide by such laws because it is fair to hold persons to what they have agreed.'
Western political tradition long has sought to justify the duty to
obey laws on citizens' consent to abide by laws.2 According to
Plato, for example, consent was the justification Socrates gave
for submitting to the death sentence that Athens issued against
him.0 3 John Locke famously argued that nothing can place a
is enduring dispute over the appropriate scope of government's regulatory
power. For recent sophisticated arguments concluding that only minimal regulatory power is justifiable, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
312 (1974) and Randy E. Barnett, ConstitutionalLegitimacy, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 111, 128 (2003). I do not intend to enter into this fray here.
201. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
202. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
119
(J.W. Gough, ed., B. Blackwell 1946) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT Ch. VI (G.D.H. Cole
trans., M. Dent & Sons 1973) (1762); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES
AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 57-59 (1979); Mark D. Rosen, Defrocking the
Courts: Resolving "Cases or Controversies," Not Announcing Transcendental
Truths, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 715, 725-26 (1994).
203. Plato, Crito, in PLATO & ARISTOPHANES: FOUR TEXTS ON SOCRATES
99, 110-11 (Thomas G. West & Grace Starry West trans., 1984) (speaking in
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person "into subjection to any earthly power but only his own
consent."24 This is the cornerstone of social contractarian theories, which seek to justify and delimit governmental power on
the basis of citizens' consent to being governed. The strength of
the notion of consent is demonstrated by the fact that many of
the most influential political theorists in our culture-not only
Locke but also Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls 2°_-are social contractarians. To be sure, each of these thinkers has a different
understanding of the proper metes and bounds of governmental
power; all, however,
the view that consent is a fair basis
•
•
• share
206
for creating obligation.
There are well-known difficulties that confront the effort to
207
justify the coercive power of the state on the basis of consent.
However, I shall argue below that these obstacles apply to exercises of power by the country where one lives, but not to a
foreign country's regulation of visitors. In the end, consent is a
fair basis for subjecting American citizens to other countries'
laws, even laws that could not constitutionally have been enacted by an American polity.
b. What Constitutes Consent
The first difficulty faced by social contractarians is that
citizens virtually never explicitly consent to laws. Apart from
immigrants, citizens are never asked whether their remaining
in the country in which they have been born means that they
have consented to abide by the country's laws. 0 8
The first difficulty leads to the second one. The "paucity of
express consentors" 20 9 means that consent must be implied. Yet
circumstances make it unlikely that one can meaningfully imthe name of the laws of Athens, Socrates argues that "to whoever of you stays
here and sees the way that we reach judgments and otherwise manage the
city, we say that he has already agreed with us in deed to do whatever we bid.
And when he does not obey, we say that he does injustice . . .

204. LOCKE, supra note 202, T 119.
205. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971) (identifying himself
as a social contractarian in the tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant).
206. Rosen, supra note 202, at 725-26.
207. For an insightful overview replete with sources, see Kreimer, supra
note 202, at 926-28. Of course, to recite objections to consent is not to say that
I necessarily agree with them. Answering the question, however, is not necessary for purposes of this Article because, as explained immediately below in
the text, most of these arguments are not applicable to the international context.
208. See Kreimer, supra note 200, at 927.
209. SIMMONS, supra note 202, at 79.
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ply consent from the mere fact that a person remains in her
country of birth. To begin, consent must be inferred from a nonaction, i.e., remaining. This always is dangerous, for inaction
could easily be explained by inertia rather than a proactive decision to remain that is accompanied by consent. Most importantly, expatriates bear extremely high exit costs: leaving
friends, family, job, and the culture into which one has been
born. 2 0 Accordingly, remaining may not reflect an affirmative
choice to remain and consent to abide by the laws of one's home
country, but instead may reflect a reluctance to incur steep
costs. 211 In fact, the social and cultural costs of living the life of
an expatriate may mean that leaving one's home country is not
a realistic option for many or most people (outside of exigent
circumstances such as famine or prosecution). 12 If so, then it is
not meaningful to describe the act of remaining where one was
born as a decision to remain, and it accordingly is problematic
to understand the act of remaining as including consent to
abide by the home country's laws.
A third difficulty with justifying the state's exercise of
power on the basis of consent concerns notice. Citizens typically
are not terribly knowledgeable about the vast majority of their
country's laws. Such ignorance
may render consent to abide by
21 3
the country's laws suspect.
None of these three objections to consent, however, has
force in respect to consent-based justifications for subjecting
citizens of Country A to the laws of Country B when that citizen directs activity to Country B. Across all three dimensions
that cast doubt on the plausibility of identifying meaningful
consent, there are crucial differences between finding consent
to the laws of one's home country (the "domestic context") and
210.

See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 73 (1987).

211. Kreimer, supra note 200, at 928 & n.75.
212. Id.
213. Whether this is so turns on the specifics of one's theory of consent. A
person's lack of knowledge presumably would undermine the legitimacy of
consent for Plato, who argues that not obeying law is unjust insofar as residents have two options: to do or to persuade. See Plato, supra note 203, at 111.
Lack of knowledge eliminates the second option. See Kreimer, supra note 200,
at 927 (plausibly asserting that "the nature of the obligations consented to
must be understood by the party who consents"). A plausible retort is that citizens consent to being bound by the products of a political process, and that

they accordingly need not be familiar with the particulars of any laws for consent to be meaningful. For present purposes I need not determine the force of

the original objection because it simply does not carry over to the international
context, as is explained below in the text.
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finding consent to the laws of a foreign country (the "foreign
context").
Consider first the nature of the consent in the foreign context: it frequently is explicit rather than implied. Companies
typically must explicitly consent to abide by the foreign country's laws in order to acquire the licenses necessary to do business.
With regard to the second difficulty, even where there is no
explicit consent it is far more plausible to identify meaningful
implied consent in the foreign context than in the domestic context. First, in the foreign context there is affirmative action; the
person has not just passively remained, but has either traveled
abroad or otherwise directed actions to the foreign country. It
accordingly is more plausible to infer a mental state. Second,
the different opportunity costs present in the foreign context
eliminate the risk of nonvoluntariness that sheds doubt on implied consent domestically. As seen above, the difficulty of
changing citizenship makes it seem that people who continue
living where they were born may not have made a meaningful
decision to do so, thereby undermining the claim that remaining includes an implied consent to abide by the home country's
laws. There are no such analogous costs in the foreign context.
The opportunity costs in the foreign context, e.g., not doing
business in the foreign country or not visiting the foreign country,214 are far lower than the opportunity cost in the domestic
context, e.g., becoming an expatriate. The lower opportunity
cost in the foreign context makes it more plausible to construe
the decision to engage with a foreign country as voluntary. The
voluntary nature of the company's or person's interaction with
the foreign country means that there is no reason to question
the intuition discussed above that a visitor meaningfully consents to abide by a foreign country's laws when interacting with
that country.2 15 Indeed, for all these reasons, most people would
probably agree it is intuitively reasonable to conclude that
those who visit or do business in another country impliedly (if
not explicitly) take upon themselves the duty to abide by that

214. This cost is heightened with respect to online businesses. I shall not
dedicate further attention to this subject in this Article, however.
215. Correspondingly, the plausibility of implied consent in the foreign context is diminished to the extent that voluntariness of the interaction is diminished; it is less plausible to find implied consent on the part of a refugee fleeing persecution, for instance.
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country's laws, as a general matter.216
The third difficulty, lack of notice, also is far less vexing in
the foreign context. To begin, licensing requirements often
specify the laws with which the licensee is expected to comply.
Moreover, there are good reasons to conclude that notice is not
an issue even where a license does not so specify, or when there
is no license requirement. Businesses, particularly sophisticated businesses, typically are knowledgeable about the laws of
foreign countries in which they do business. Indeed, such
knowledge likely is a prerequisite to the responsible conduct of
business. For these reasons, lack of knowledge to what one is
consenting typically is not an issue for businesses that transact
business internationally (though it might be relevant for some
small businesses).
The same cannot be said, however, for the average individual tourist. If anything, tourists are likely to be less knowledgeable about a foreign country's laws than are the foreign
country's citizens. The knowledge that reasonably can be imputed to a tourist is highly context sensitive, however, turning
on such considerations as the substantive law in question and
the reasons for the individual's visit. For instance, visitors who
go to Kenya to hunt plausibly can be expected to know the
regulations governing which and how many game may be
bagged. A visitor might not properly be deemed to have consented to less well known laws that do not affect the average
tourist but that his activities just happened to touch upon.
Notably, contemporary enforcement doctrine (both in its
common law form of comity and in the statutes and treaties
that address discrete aspects of the enforcement of foreign
judgments)2 17 provides a check to ensure that the party subject
to the foreign law has meaningfully consented to that law. A
threshold prerequisite to the enforcement of a foreign judgment
is that the foreign court's exercise of power was consistent with
216. This is not to suggest that the visitor's home jurisdiction loses interest
in its citizen when she goes abroad. The visitor's out-of-country activities may
well affect the interests of her home country such that the home country also
has regulatory jurisdiction, resulting in concurrent regulatory jurisdiction. Cf
Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritorialityand Political Heterogeneity in American
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 882-91, 914-16 (2002) (noting a parallel
phenomenon with regard to states within the United States). Indeed, there
may be circumstances where a host country does not have legitimate regulatory jurisdiction over a visitor. The point above in the text simply is that visiting a foreign country typically entails meaningful consent to abide by its laws.
217. See supra Part II.A.
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the requirements of personal jurisdiction.
Under the Ameri
can approach, personal jurisdiction can be established by
means of either "general" jurisdiction" or "specific" jurisdiction.219 General jurisdiction is established where a party has
had continuous and systematic contacts with a forum.2"' Specific jurisdiction requires a showing that the party has "purposefully directed" its activities to the forum and that the litigation "arise[s] out of or relate[s] to" that purposeful
availment 221
.
The cornerstones of personal jurisdiction thus are
concepts that are intimately related to meaningful consent:
foreseeability and purposeful availment. More specifically, "the
foreseeability that is critical [is] ... that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
222
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."
Although personal jurisdiction is directed to establishing adjudicatory jurisdiction rather than legislative jurisdiction, 223 personal jurisdiction's requirements of foreseeability and purposeful availment go a long way toward ensuring that there has
been meaningful consent to the forum's substantive law, as
218. See, e.g., Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, § 4(a)(2),
13 U.L.A. 49 (2002) ("A foreign judgment is not conclusive if... the foreign
court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92 (1971).

An important question is whether this means that the foreign court
should be held to the same requirements as American courts. American courts
typically apply American constitutional doctrines in making this determination. See, e.g., Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (N.D. Cal.
1977), affd, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980). Though beyond the scope of this Article, the better view is that the foreign court's exercise of jurisdiction only
need be consistent with the broad policies of personal jurisdiction, though not
necessarily all the doctrinal details of American due process. The same policy
considerations underlying comity-particularly facilitating operation of the
international legal system and supporting political heterogeneity across countries-suggest that it would be inappropriate to hold foreign courts to the
identical requirements that due process imposes on domestic courts. The Draft
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments takes this approach. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
219. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985).
220. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
416-17 (1983).

221. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958) ("[It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.").
222. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
223. See supra note 199 (explaining the difference between legislative and
adjudicatory jurisdiction).
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well. 2 4 To the extent that foreseeability and purposeful availment do not provide such assurance, enforcement analysis
ought to reflect the understanding that fairness to the losing
party mandates that she could be said to have objectively consented to the issuing country's substantive laws.
c.

The Limits of Consent

Even where there has been meaningful consent to abide by
a foreign law, should an American court respect it? American
law sometimes refuses to respect the informed choices made by
its citizens.225 Should an American citizen's or corporation's
consent to abide by foreign laws that an American polity could
not constitutionally have enacted be considered per se unfair to
that citizen or corporation?
No. To begin, holding otherwise would treat foreign countries more strictly than American polities, for American citizens may waive many constitutional rights they hold vis-A-vis
American polities. 226 For example, American citizens may in-

criminate themselves, refuse to be represented by counsel, consent to being searched absent probable cause, or plead guilty
and thereby waive all procedural rights. 227 Although the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 228 is notoriously unsusceptible to
a principled doctrinal description,229 one unquestionable thing
224. See Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Saxony Carpet Co., 899
F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affid, 104 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1996).
225. American courts will not enforce certain substantive provisions under
substantive unconscionability or under contract law's public policy exception.
For more on this, see infra text accompanying notes 244-247.
226. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox,97 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 801
(2003).
227. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936-37 (1991) (enumerating
a sample of constitutional rights that can be waived). Indeed, many constitutional rights can be waived under circumstances not only where there is no
explicit waiver, but also where one is hard pressed to find even meaningful
implied waiver. See id.
228. For an informative discussion of the relationship between the doctrines of waiver and unconstitutional conditions, see Mazzone, supra note 226.
229. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1195 (1990)
(noting that the "principal recent commentators on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine have all agreed that the Court has yet to arrive, explicitly or
implicitly, at a clear limiting principle for deciding challenges to conditions on
government benefits"); Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: UnconstitutionalConditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989
(1995) (trying to explain why it is not to be expected that a consistency doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can be generated); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
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that can be said is that virtually all 230 constitutional rights can
be waived under some circumstances. 23' Here are some exam-

ples: the federal government can "condition[] receipt [of assistance] under Aid to Families with Dependent Children... on
the recipient's submission to warrantless searches of her
home";232 the receipt of federal funds under the Public Health
Services Act can be conditioned on family planning clinics'
agreement to not recommend or counsel abortion as a method
of family planning;
Congress can bar federal food stamps
from otherwise eligible households that become needy because
a household member is on strike.234 In short, the notion that
constitutional rights are inalienable and accordingly may not
be waived235 has not been accepted by courts.236 It would be
strange if the law that permits American citizens to waive constitutional rights did not allow them to waive nonconstitutional
analogues 3 7 of those rights in respect of foreign countries.3 8
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (1989) ("As applied.., the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is riven with inconsistencies.").
230. A notable exception is the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
231. See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936-37.
232. Sullivan, supra note 229, at 1437 (describing Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309 (1971)).
233. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-79 (1991).
234. See Lyng v. Int'l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 362-64 (1988). Although
the Court has not held labor strikes themselves to be constitutionally protected speech or association, it is not far-fetched to assume that "union membership implicates at least some protected freedoms of speech and association." Sullivan, supra note 229, at 1438.
235. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of
Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352, 1378-93
(1984).
236. See Baker, supra note 229, at 1215 & n.113; Sullivan, supra note 229,
at 1477 & n.285.
237. I say "analogues" for the following reason: because the First Amendment does not bind France, agreeing to abide by France's hate speech law
cannot be said to waive an actual First Amendment right.
238. Black letter unconstitutional conditions doctrine permits constitutional rights to be waived so long as the government has not coerced it. See
Baker, supra note 229, at 1194-95 (noting that "the rhetoric of individual
'choice' versus 'coercion' permeates" the Court's discussions of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Sullivan, supra note 229, at 1428-43 (collecting
cases where the Court analyzed conditions in terms of coercion). I do not mean
to suggest that the distinction between "choice" and "coercion" is an adequate
line for demarcating permissible from unconstitutional conditions on either
positive or normative grounds: indeed, scholarly commentators uniformly have
critiqued the distinction and offered alternative approaches. See Baker, supra
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Furthermore, to conclude that it is per se unfair to permit
an American citizen to consent to un-American laws is to decide
that traveling American citizens properly are immune to those
laws of their host country that an American polity could not
have enacted. What notion of fairness suggests that American
citizens are entitled to such immunity? Immunizing traveling
Americans from such foreign laws may well interfere with the
foreign country's ability to ensure compliance with its policies.
Though comity is not theoretically rich enough to provide a
principled answer as to why this would be problematic, Rawlsian theory is. Such interference with the foreign culture
would be per se problematic from the vantage point of the second original position; the culture-preserving orientation that is
derived from a Rawlsian approach leads to the conclusion that
visitors who are unwilling to abide by a host country's norms
should not come, not that host countries should be required to
treat visitors in accordance with their home countries' constitutional norms regardless of the effects this might have on the
host country's cultural norms.24 ° Indeed, immunizing traveling
Americans sometimes might jeopardize political stability in the
host country; it is entirely possible that an act of plainly speaking one's mind in public, which in the United States would be
constitutionally permissible and harmless, might have devastating consequences in another country. More generally, the
meaning and possible consequences of a particular action might
radically change depending on where it, or its consequences, occur.2 1' Accordingly, fairness does not demand that an activity
allowed in place A also be permissible in place B. 242
note 229, at 1192-93; Schauer, supra note 229, at 995-96; Sullivan, supra note
229, at 1433, 1450-56. Nonetheless it is notable that a foreign government's
conditioning travel to its country or doing business with its country on the
traveler/business's agreement to abide by its laws is almost certain to be less
"coercive" than almost any condition that an American government might attach to its own citizen's receipt of governmental benefits. This is true for the
same reasons discussed above as to why it is more plausible to infer consent on
the part of foreign travelers than on the part of domestic citizens. See supra
Part IV.A.2.b.
239. See supra Part II.C (discussing limits to comity case law).
240. See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
241. Though it is simplest to make this point by reference to physical location, the proposition is not tied to physical geography. That is to say, legitimate state interests that justify governmental regulation are not determined
exclusively by physical location. See generally Rosen, supra note 216, at 88291, 914-16 (describing the normative argument for extraterritoriality and discussing the right to travel as a limit on states' power).
242. The reasonableness of this proposition is strongly suggested by the
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This is not to suggest that there should be no limits on that
to which a person can consent. The most important of these
limits will be discussed later under the rubric of the interests of
the enforcing country.24 3 Limitations derived from paternalism,
however, merit mention in the present section, which considers
fairness vis-A-vis the individual parties. Consider the substantive provisions in domestic contract law that courts will not enforce. Although American contract law "confers upon contracting parties wide power to shape their relationships," 24 4 courts
occasionally refuse to enforce a substantive provision on the
ground that it would violate public policy.24

For instance, con-

tracts creating slavery are void in all jurisdictions,24 6 and gaming contracts are unenforceable in many states.247
Contractual limitations that interfere with speech and related First Amendment rights, however, have been upheld consistently in American courts.

248

For example, courts have en-

forced settlement agreements in which a party agreed not to
fact that the locus of an activity sometimes is highly relevant to the activity's
constitutionality under American constitutional law. To take an example from
the First Amendment, there are locations in the United States where a citizen
is not permitted to speak or do what she may in Los Angeles. For example,
government officials in some places in the United States (namely, army bases)
may prohibit speech that is merely "intemperate.... disloyal, contemptuous
and disrespectful," Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 739, 758-59 (1974), may enact prior restraints, Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 349, 358 (1980) (upholding
Air Force regulation requiring "members of the service to obtain approval from
their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases"), and may
ban private citizens' political speech, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38
(1976). Such regulations would be impermissible virtually anywhere else in
the United States. In short, the content of people's rights may be tied to geography: either where they are physically located or where their actions have
effects. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: GeographicalVariations of ConstitutionalRequirements in the Aid of Community,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1152-56 (1999) (discussing nonuniformity in constitutional requirements in connection with the military community). As such,
there is no reason to believe that fairness to the individual demands that she
be permitted to speak or do in Country B what she may speak or do in Los Angeles.
243. See infra Part IV.C.
244.

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 426 (3d ed. 1999).

245. Id. at 321.
246. This is due to the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery, which is
directly applicable to private individuals. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) (noting that the
Thirteenth Amendment applies to individuals).
247. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 518-21 (3d
ed. 1990).
248. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part III.B.2.a).

2004]

UN-AMERICAN JUDGMENTS

publicly criticize a certain type of psychological therapy24 9 and
restrictive covenants in condominium bylaws that barred the
posting of signs. 50 If American citizens can consent to limiting
their speech by entering into a contract with another American
citizen-and they can-should they be more constrained in limiting their autonomy when they enter into a relationship with a
foreign country? Does it make sense, in other words, to say that
American citizens should be permitted to consensually limit the
scope of their freedom less with foreign entities than with fellow citizens? From the standpoint of fairness to the American
citizen, the party with whom she contracts would not seem to
be relevant.
If anything, there are reasons to think that the limitations
with regard to enforcing foreign judgments should be less strict
than the public policy limitations that void domestic contracts.
First, foreign judgments based on foreign laws are-as their
name indicates-judgments.The American law of full faith and
credit long has treated judgments more "exacting[ly]" than
laws, requiring courts from State A to enforce judgments from
State B even though A's courts would not have been required to
apply B's law had the litigation occurred in A's courts. 251 For
example, though Mississippi refused to enforce certain futures
contracts on the ground that they were gambling contracts that
were contrary to public policy, Mississippi was required to enforce a Missouri court's judgment that was based on such a contract which a Mississippi could have refused to enforce.25 2 Although full faith and credit does not apply to the judgments of
foreign countries,2 3 the core policy considerations justifying the
different treatment accorded to judgments apply equally to foreign judgments: the desire for finality and the greater potential
for interpolity friction owing to the fact that a judgment is a
more focused declaration of state policy than is a general law.
An American court accordingly might be justified in enforcing a
foreign judgment premised on a substantive contract right that
it would not have enforced, on grounds of public policy, if it had
249. State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858, 870-72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). See generally
Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part III.B.2.a) (discussing judicial enforcement of limitations on speech).
250. Linn Valley Lakes Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Brockway, 824 P.2d 948, 951
(Kan. 1992); Midlake on Big Boulder Lake Condo. Ass'n v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d
340, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
251. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1998).
252. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
253. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912).
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appeared in a domestic contract.
Second, the policy behind not upholding a domestic contractual provision might be absent when the consent runs from
an American citizen to a foreign government or foreign national. This would be true, for example, if the refusal to enforce
the domestic contract provision aimed not to protect the promisor, but to penalize promisees who exact overly strict concessions. 254 It is plausible that a substantive provision in a contract
between two Americans deemed to violate public policy would
be acceptable if it had been negotiated between an American
and a foreign national (or if it had been imposed as a regulation
by a foreign country). In the former case, a fellow member of
one's political community is seeking to impose restrictions on a
fellow citizen that are at variance with their shared culture. In
the latter case, a foreign national or country may be seeking to
protect its particular values, and there is no reasonable expectation that the foreigner need share American values.
Doctrinally, such interests of the foreign country's political
community should be legally relevant under the balancing test
typically used to determine whether to refuse enforcement on
1
Indeed, the interests of protecting a
grounds of public policy. 55

foreign political community are more weighty than a private
party promisee's interest in exacting concessions from a fellow
member of her political community that run against the shared
values of the political community to which they both belong.
This does not mean that the foreign country's political interests
are dispositive, but simply that the foreign and domestic promisee are differently situated for purposes of a public policy
analysis.
B. INTERESTS OF THE ISSUING COUNTRY
The next set of interests that are implicated by enforcement determinations is that of the foreign country that has issued the foreign judgment (the "Issuing Country"). The weight
accorded to the Issuing Country's interests varies depending
upon one's ante-legal commitments. The Issuing Country's interests are relevant to comity, but comity has an inadequately
theorized concept of "sovereignty" to assess the nature of that
254. Cf FARNSWORTH, supra note 244, at 322 (noting that many of the considerations that may move a court to refuse to enforce an agreement on

grounds of public policy "turn on reluctance to aid the promisee rather than on
solicitude for the promisor").

255. See id. at 324.
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interest. Under Rawlsian theory, protecting the Issuing Country's culture is a core value, as long as the Issuing Country fits
the paradigm of either a liberal or decent hierarchical society.
After all, the person in the second original position does not
know which peoples she represents and accordingly adopts a
principle of equality that seeks to protect all liberal and decent
hierarchical peoples in the same ways. Under game theory,
however, the Issuing Country's interests are relevant only if respecting them advances the enforcing jurisdiction's parochial
interests. For instance, game theory counsels enforcement if
the Issuing Country's political stability is in the U.S.'s interest
and enforcing the foreign judgment will advance stability.
The analysis that follows applies to a Rawlsian approach.
It also can be applied to comity; comity already takes account of
the Issuing Country's interests, and the following analysis can
enrich this aspect of a comity inquiry. The analysis does not,
however, apply to a game theoretical approach, under which
the Issuing Country's interests are wholly derivative of U.S. interests, for such analysis inevitably is country specific and
situation specific.
The Issuing Country typically has two main interests in
the enforcement of its judgment. The first reflects the policy
concerns that underlie the act of state doctrine: that the official
acts of a foreign government be respected by other countries.25 6
Refusing to respect a duly issued foreign judgment violates this
interest of the foreign country. This is the interest that has
been recognized in the comity case law.
Second, the foreign country has an interest in seeing that
other countries do not interfere with its policies. Failing to enforce a foreign judgment can frustrate the ability of the foreign
country's citizens to obtain compensation in accordance with
the country's public policy. Nonenforcement also can hinder the
foreign country's ability to ensure compliance with its noncompensatory policies. When American courts decline to enforce
judgments based on foreign laws that American polities could
not have enacted, they impede foreign countries from governing
themselves simply because their legal norms are at variance
with American constitutional doctrines. For example, although
France has a commitment to free speech, French doctrine permits more extensive regulation of hate speech than U.S. law al-

256. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
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lows. 25 7 The U.S. district court's refusal to enforce a French
judgment in the Yahoo! case frustrated France's ability to enforce its law, and thereby to ensure its efficacy, simply because
the French law did not conform to U.S. First Amendment doctrine.258
The Issuing Country's interest in this second sense accordingly is a function of the legitimacy of its regulatory efforts.
Several caveats follow from this. 5 9 First, the regulation must be
257. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three
Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1282 (2000).
258. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme,
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
259. One also could argue that the legitimacy of the issuing country's interest turns on the substantive content of its regulation. I prefer, however, to
treat this issue of appropriate limitations on the foreign country's law under
the rubric of the interests of the enforcing country, and I accordingly discuss it
in the next subsection.
Two other considerations plausibly bear on the legitimacy of the issuing
country's interests. It might be thought that the issuing country has no legitimate interest in enforcement (1) if its law can be readily circumvented by
other means that the issuing country has not addressed or (2) if compliance
with its laws can be achieved by means aside from having its judgments enforced by foreign courts. In the end, however, a Rawlsian analysis suggests
that neither of these considerations should be permitted to enter into the enforcing jurisdiction's calculation as to whether a foreign judgment is to be enforced.
Both considerations would call for too much speculation on the part of the
enforcing jurisdiction and hence would put the interests of the issuing jurisdiction at risk-something that persons in the second original position, who for
the reasons discussed above would choose culture-preserving rules, would not
wish to do. See supra Part III.C.1. Indeed, both considerations would open the
door to disregarding the issuing country's interests even where persons in the
second original position would think that the issuing country's interests ought
to be taken into account. With respect to the first consideration, although virtually all laws can be circumvented, laws need not be (and typically are not)
fully enforced to be generally effective. Because it is unlikely that the enforcing jurisdiction could accurately ascertain the extent of a foreign law's circumvention, much less determine whether such circumvention rendered the law
inefficacious, a person in the original position would not want this consideration to factor into the Enforcing Jurisdiction's enforcement determination.
With regard to the second consideration, enforcement almost always can
be effectuated by alternatives to the private causes of action that create the
foreign judgments that an Enforcing Jurisdiction is asked to enforce. There
are many valid reasons, however, for relying on private causes of action to
help enforce laws. For instance, the executive branch might have inadequate
resources to ensure enforcement, private lawsuits might facilitate compensation, and so forth. A person in the second original position hence would conclude that discounting the issuing country's interest in having its judgments
enforced simply because there were alternative ways it could have enforced its
law would unduly interfere with the appropriate scope of the foreign country's
regulatory powers.
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authorized under the Issuing Country's internal law, for there
can be no legitimate interest on the part of the Issuing Country
if the regulation at issue is not legal under its own laws. Second, the Issuing Country's effort to regulate must be consistent
with the customary international law principles governing the
scope of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, 60 and the application of its law in the judgment at hand must have been
consistent with generally accepted principles of international
choice of law.26' If the foreign country's regulatory effort does
not satisfy these tests, then the foreign judgment should not be
enforced. For example, a hypothetical Iranian judgment enjoining publication in the United States of Rushdie's Satanic Verses
should not be enforced by an American court2 62 because such a
judgment would exceed the scope of legitimate prescriptive jurisdiction under customary international law.263

260. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402-04
(1986); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF NATIONAL LAws 35-40 (Dieter Lange & Gary B. Born eds., 1987). Tying
enforcement to the international customary law concerning prescriptive jurisdiction is not entirely satisfactory because there are deep doctrinal disputes
among countries with respect to prescriptive jurisdiction. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323,
323-24. But there is consensus about many matters, and analysis at the very
least should take account of those largely undisputed parts of the customary
international law of legislative jurisdiction.
261. Although the requirement of consistency with international choice of
law would not be a strict limitation insofar as choice of law principles are notoriously flexible, it would serve to weed out outrageous regulatory attempts.
262. An important institutional question arises as to which branch of government ought make this type of determination. In the classic statement of
the act of state doctrine, the Court held on separation-of-powers grounds that
determinations of the validity of another country's laws should not be made by
American courts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423
(1964). This is yet another reason for concluding that U.S. policy regarding the
enforcement of foreign judgments ought to be laid down in the first instance by
the more political branches. At the same time, increasing globalization and
judicial involvement with foreign matters might suggest that American courts
inevitably will have to play a larger role in matters that touch upon foreign
relations than they did in 1964, when Sabbatino was decided. I do not intend
to resolve this important question in this Article.
263. The only plausibly applicable category of prescriptive jurisdiction
would be the effects doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. d (1986). Though countries are divided as to the
scope of effects jurisdiction, see THE INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note
260, at 36-37, it is inconceivable that "effects" would be given so broad a scope
as to encompass the Iranian regulation discussed above in the text.
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C. INTERESTS OF THE ENFORCING JURISDICTION
(HERE, THE UNITED STATES)

Analyzing the interests of the enforcing jurisdiction is
complex. Contemporary comity doctrine takes account of U.S.
interests via the public policy exception in a problematically
undertheorized fashion that fails to explain why the exception
is unilateralist and why its threshold is high. In respect of the
interests of the enforcing jurisdiction, the policy prescriptions
of game theory and Rawlsian political theory diverge starkly.
Moreover, each approach's relationship to comity is complex. A
game theoretic approach calls for a unilateralist approach akin
to the public policy exception in formal structure, but would
advocate broadening the scope of the exception. Rawlsian
analysis requires a multilateralist approach, but the standard
it uses for determining what foreign judgments should not be
enforced likely would not look much different from what is
found under the public policy exception.
1.

Comity and the Public Policy Exception
Understanding that it is not unconstitutional for an
American court to enforce an un-American judgment, a court
confronted with such a judgment would ask whether it was "re264
pugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just."
So formulated, the public policy exception is unilateralist in
structure because it considers only the U.S.'s interest and does
not invite consideration of the Issuing Country's interest. It
also is important to note that the public policy exception does
not provide a principled basis for determining the contours of
these standards. Would France's hate speech law trigger the
exception? England's pro-plaintiff defamation law? The analyst
applying the public policy exception would have to utilize some
theory, whether explicit or implicit, to answer these questions.
Here is how game theory and Rawlsian political theory would
resolve them.
2. Game Theory
As seen above, analysts adopting a game theoretic approach analyze enforcement strictly from the perspective of
264. In re Will of Brown, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 341 (Sur. Ct. 1986). Courts
would resort to a comity analysis where a treaty or statute did not govern the
enforcement decision, as is the case most of the time.

20041

UN-AMERICAN JUDGMENTS

maximizing U.S. parochial interests. Game theory thus calls for
a unilateralist analysis. Though game theory suggests that it
generally is in U.S. interests to enforce foreign judgments, the
conclusion is different as regards un-American judgments.
Game theory suggests that un-American judgments should not
be enforced when such judgments come from countries that do
not enforce a broad range of American judgments that are
deemed to be violative of their public policy, unless enforcing
such an un-American judgment is peculiarly in the interest of
the United States (for example, for the purpose of securing political stability). If and when a particular foreign country enforces a wide range of U.S. judgments, however, game theory
suggests that American courts should enforce un-American
judgments. In short, a game theoretic analysis does not counsel
against American enforcement of un-American judgments as a
categorical matter.
The game theoretic analysis of un-American judgments
runs as follows. 265 The United States already enforces foreign
judgments more frequently than most other countries enforce
U.S. judgments.266 Intuition alone suggests that cutting back
U.S. enforcement of foreign judgments so that U.S. practice
moved in the direction of these other countries' practices would
not necessarily jeopardize the regime of cooperation vis-A-vis
foreign judgments that has developed. The game theoretic re265. One might think that occasional U.S. nonenforcement would not be
problematic under a game theoretic analysis because enforcement issues are
best understood as bilateral games and a decision not to enforce accordingly
would jeopardize, at most, a bilateral relationship between the United States
and the country whose judgment it refused to enforce, not the entire international regime. A policy of not enforcing un-American judgments, however,
would affect U.S. relations vis-A-vis foreign judgments with a large number of
countries. Consider things just from the perspective of the First Amendment.
U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence is anomalous with regard to the protection it affords speech. Virtually every other country with constitutional commitments to free speech tolerates greater intrusions into speech to protect the
public good (through such things as hate speech legislation). See Sionaidh
Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the
American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 317
(1999). See generally IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN, ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN LAW (Ian Loveland ed.,

1998). As a result, even if enforcement decisions are best modeled as bilateral
games, American refusal to enforce un-American judgments would affect U.S.
relations with many countries.
266. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 52, at 1194-98. For example, England
has a statute that not only denies recognition to U.S. antitrust judgments, but
also allows the defendant in the foreign proceeding to recover treble damages
he had to pay from the plaintiffs British assets. Id. at 1195.
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finement26 7 known as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution 268 supports the conclusion that the United States should
not enforce all foreign judgments from Country X if that country doesn't enforce all U.S. judgments. This refinement assumes that players in a repeat game (such as the enforcement
of foreign judgments) start out with certain beliefs as to how
the other players will act and then update their beliefs when
they observe how the other players actually act. 269 Each player
will then act in accordance with
270 the revised belief in a manner
that will maximize her payoff.
Applied to the enforcement of foreign judgments, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution analysis would be as follows.
Although the enforcement of foreign judgments is properly
modeled as either a prisoner's dilemma or a stag hunt, meaning
that enforcement of the other's foreign judgments is mutually
beneficial,271 the United States would learn over time that a
particular foreign country does not enforce U.S. judgments under certain predictable circumstances (i.e., when the judgment
is contrary to the foreign country's public policy). The United
States then would not have to enforce all of that foreign country's judgments in order to induce the foreign country to enforce
the U.S. judgments it enforces.
The result would be the reciprocal enforcement of foreign
judgments not contrary to public policy coupled with the reciprocal nonenforcement of judgments that are deemed to be contrary to public policy. To posit that the United States would enforce all the foreign country's judgments where the foreign
country enforces most but not all U.S. judgments would run
267. Games frequently have multiple equilibria. See BAIRD ET AL., supra
note 113, at 313. Refinements eliminate equilibria that players are unlikely to
adopt. Id.
268. See id. at 80-89. "Perfect" refers to the notion that players will act in
conformity with their beliefs. Id. at 84. "Bayesian" refers to the idea that players put probabilities on different events occurring and then update their beliefs as they acquire new information. Id at 83.
269. See id. at 84.
270. See id. According to Baird,
[a] proposed solution to a game is suspect if it depends on one of the
players having beliefs that are inconsistent with the actions that the
players take in equilibrium ....We can test whether a proposed equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium... [by asking] whether, in
the proposed equilibrium, a player's actions are a best response, given
that player's beliefs and the actions and beliefs of the other players.
Id.
271. See supra Part III.B.
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contrary to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution because it
would assume that the United States would select a suboptimal
strategy, given a rational belief by the United States as revised
over time as to how the foreign country will act. Such a strategy would be suboptimal from the U.S. perspective because if
the foreign country does not enforce U.S. judgments contrary to
its public policy, then the United States similarly would prefer
not to enforce judgments based on the foreign country's laws
that are contrary to U.S. public policy, in light of the fact that
enforcing such judgments
invariably imposes some costs on the
272
country.
enforcing
I will call the approach implied by the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium solution a rule of "tailored reciprocity," for the following reasons. "Reciprocity" in the enforcement context refers
to the Enforcing Country conditioning enforcement on the Issuing Country's having enforced the Enforcing Country's judgments in the past. Under a reciprocity regime of the untailored
variety, the Issuing Country's failure to enforce U.S. judgments
that are contrary to the foreign country's public policy would
mean that the U.S. should not enforce any of the Issuing Country's judgments. Early U.S. enforcement doctrine contained
such a reciprocity requirement, 273 but this has been discarded
by most American jurisdictions. 274 "Tailored reciprocity" is a
more refined tit-for-tat strategy than the old reciprocity doctrine: rather than asking generally whether the other country
enforces its foreign judgments, a country would ask whether
the other country enforces the type of judgment that is before
it. To be clear, "tailored reciprocity" is not currently found in
the law, but it is the method that is suggested by a game theoretic approach.
It is important to note that even under current conditions,
where many foreign countries do not enforce many U.S. judgments, game theory leads to the conclusion that sometimes un272. This analysis presumes, however, that each country can readily ascertain the scope of the other's public policy exception. If not, then Player i's
nonenforcement on public policy grounds might be construed by Player 2 as a
decision not to enforce foreign judgments more generally, regardless of the
rhetoric deployed by courts of Player 1, leading Player 2 not to enforce Player
'sjudgments, which in turn would lead Player 1 not to enforce Player 2's
judgments more generally, and so on. Though there undoubtedly could be hard
cases, un-American judgments, in the main, presumably would be readily
identifiable as being contrary to public policy.
273. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
274. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 52, at 1195-98.
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American judgments should be enforced. Some countries generally enforce U.S. judgments, and their foreign judgmentseven un-American judgments hailing from those countriesaccordingly should be enforced. Moreover, it might be beneficial
to the United States to enforce an un-American judgment if
nonenforcement threatened the foreign country's political stability. To provide an analogy, notwithstanding American commitments to free political association, after World War II the
United States approved a constitution for Germany275 that subjected the freedom of association to a content-based restriction
that "explicitly forb[ade] the formation of anti-democratic and
other antithetical groups."276
3. Rawlsian Theory
As shown above, Rawlsian analysis calls for a multilateralist approach that takes account of enforcement's costs to the
Enforcing Country as well as nonenforcement's costs to the Issuing Country. Furthermore, a Rawlsian analysis suggests that
the only cultures that ought to be protected are those belonging
to liberal and decent hierarchical societies. Judgments based on
those laws of outlaw states, societies burdened by unfavorable
conditions, and benevolent absolutisms that would not be enacted by liberal or decent hierarchical societies should not be
enforced 277
.
It follows that it is not necessary under a Rawlsian approach that the foreign law be conterminous with American
constitutional requirements. Indeed, even some foreign judgments based on nonliberal laws would be eligible for enforcement under Rawls's account. 278 England and France readily
279
qualify as liberal democratic societies under Rawls's criteria.
275. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY 10 (1994).
276. Donna E. Arzt, Nuremberg, Denazification and Democracy: The Hate
Speech Problem at the International Military Tribunal, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTs. 689, 733 (1995) (book review).
277. See supra Part III.C. As Rawls recognizes, the issue raised here is the

extent to which liberal societies should not only tolerate, but give affirmative
assistance to nonliberal, societies. See RAWLS, supra note 79, at 60-64, 78-80.
278. In particular, Rawls's analysis suggests that liberal states should enforce nonliberal laws from decent yet hierarchical peoples. See RAWLS, supra
note 79, at 69 (noting that "equality does not hold" within decent hierarchical
societies). By definition, this would include laws that treat people differently

depending on the social group to which they belonged. See id.
279. See id. at 12-16 (enumerating the criteria that define liberal democratic societies).
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The mere fact that Britain's libel laws and France's hate speech
legislation are not identical to First Amendment doctrine would
not render illegitimate the British or French interests in having their judgments enforced, from a Rawlsian perspective.28 0
Many foreign judgments, however, categorically should not
be enforced under a Rawlsian analysis. For instance, neither a
private broadcast that was the equivalent to the "Voice of
Peace" nor a person who posted a Web site outside the outlaw
country that advocated political change would have to fear that
a U.S. court would enforce a foreign judgment obtained in the
outlaw state that was based on a law that sought to inhibit political change, for such a law is not consistent with liberal or
decent hierarchical societies. The same would be true of a foreign judgment that enforced a slavery contract. More generally,
those judgments based on laws that reflect the problematic
practices of outlaw states, societies burdened by unfavorable
conditions, and benevolent absolutisms should not be enforced.
Although it can be difficult on the margins to distinguish these
three types of countries from liberal and decent hierarchical societies, the Rawlsian conceptual scheme provides significantly
more guidance than does the public policy exception's naked
term of "repugnance."
As to those foreign judgments that are not categorically excluded from enforcement, Rawlsian analysis calls for a "comparative impairment" approach that takes account of the domestic costs of enforcement and the foreign costs of
nonenforcement. With respect to assessing the domestic costs
of enforcement, three things bear mention. First, different
countries have different needs, and a person who fully supported an aggressive First Amendment jurisprudence in the
United States might think it affirmatively good that different
laws apply in another country that has a different history and

280. Id. at 11-12. According to Rawls,
[e]ven when two or more peoples have liberal constitutional regimes,
their conceptions of constitutionalism may diverge and express different variations of liberalism. A (reasonable) Law of Peoples must be
acceptable to reasonable peoples who are thus diverse; and it must be
fair between them and effective in shaping the larger schemes of their
cooperation.

Id.
281. I am indebted to Philip Hamburger for posing a similar hypothetical
to me.
282. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (explaining the comparative impairment approach).
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culture. Consider, once again, U.S. support after World War II
for constitutional limitations in Germany that placed contentbased limits on the rights of political association.
Second, the domestic costs of enforcing a foreign judgment
might be less than first appears. Costs would be only slight if
enforcement of foreign judgments were not popularly viewed as
governmental endorsement of the laws underlying the judgments but simply as something that courts do by virtue of their
being courts. Indeed, there are reasons to think that the American public in fact draws a distinction between judicial enforcement of legal rights and governmental support of the underlying substantive legal rights.283 Popular understanding of the
judiciary may encompass the distinction between enforcement
of foreign judgments and governmental endorsement of the
laws underlying such judgments.
Third, the robustness of the constitutional norm at issue
likely affects the actual costs of enforcing a foreign judgment.
283. Consider, for example, the durability of the rule of Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386 (1947), which states that state courts are required to apply even
those parts of federal law with which they disagree. State courts thus are
treated differently than state executives and legislatures, for under the quasiTenth Amendment doctrine of anti-commandeering, the federal government is
disabled from requiring state executives to enforce federal law, see Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), or requiring that state legislatures
enact a law, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). The
primary justification is that commandeering undermines political accountability; citizens would erroneously blame state legislatures for enacting a law that
Congress required them to enact.
Testa's rule has survived contemporary anti-commandeering doctrine. See
Printz, 521 U.S. at 907. Requiring state courts to apply federal law is not
deemed to constitute federal commandeering of state courts because, the Supreme Court has explained, courts apply the law of other sovereigns all the
time. Id. Because courts frequently apply other sovereigns' laws by virtue of
their being courts, U.S. citizens do not assume that a state court's application
of a given law indicates state endorsement of that law.
The same rationale may apply here: Citizens may appreciate that an
American court's enforcement of a foreign judgment based on a law that an
American polity could not have enacted is simply another example of a court
being asked to apply another sovereign's laws. Accordingly, the enforcement of
a foreign judgment would not be understood as an American polity's support
for the substantive law underlying the judgment, but as an instance of an
American court doing its job of being a court-a job that sometimes requires it
to apply another sovereign's laws. However, the social meaning of enforcement
may well be a function of whether the court is enforcing a judgment for damages or injunctive relief. The latter could well be construed as constituting
more active participation on the part of an American polity. To the extent this
were true, the domestic interest in not enforcing the foreign judgment would
increase under a game theoretic approach.
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The stronger the norm, the less is the cost of enforcing a foreign
country's judgment insofar as the strong norm is unlikely to be
disturbed.
D. INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The final entity affected by enforcement determinations is
the international system. Comity case law long has assumed
that enforcing foreign judgments unqualifiedly advances the interests of the international system by increasing legal predictability and eliminating duplicative proceedings.28 4 This is yet
another example of comity's undertheorization, for careful
thought suggests that there are potential downsides from the
perspective of the international system to enforcing even simple foreign judgments.28 5 Ultimately, the significance of these
costs is a function of the analyst's prior political commitments.
While these objections fall away under a Rawlsian perspective,
several survive under a game theoretic approach and are appropriately taken into account when analyzing the costs and
benefits of enforcing un-American judgments under a game
theoretic rubric.28 6
Enforcing foreign judgments increases transaction costs by
making it necessary for companies that engage in international
activities to tailor their behaviors to different jurisdictions.
Such "compliance" costs are necessary because enforcing foreign judgments makes the foreign law more efficacious by making it less easily evaded. The comity case law has not recognized these compliance costs.
How ought these costs influence enforcement determinations? Whether and to what extent they are legally relevant
turns on the analyst's prior political commitments. To illustrate, such costs are understood differently under the game
theoretic and Rawlsian approaches. To the extent that such
business costs ultimately are absorbed by the United States,
they are properly included in the cost-benefit analysis that

284. See supra Part II.B.
285. One might ask why an article focusing on un-American judgments
should address such generic costs of enforcement. The answer is that a fll
analysis demands an accounting of even such heretofore overlooked generic
costs since the costs of enforcing un-American judgments are a function of the
costs of enforcing general foreign judgments plus the sui generis costs that attend enforcing foreign judgments that are antithetical to American constitutional values.
286. The same is true with regard to simple foreign judgments.
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drives a game theoretical analysis and they accordingly counsel
against enforcement (though they do not on their own lead to
the conclusion of nonenforcement insofar as there may be countervailing benefits to enforcing the judgment). Under a Rawlsian approach, on the other hand, such costs are inevitable byproducts of doing business in a world in which there are many
countries. The only way to limit such costs would be to identify
a single governing law, and persons in the second original position would prefer a legal regime that created such transaction
costs to the alternative of a single regulatory regime that put
their culture at risk.
Relatedly, it might be thought that enforcing foreign judgments could lead to a race to the bottom (where the "bottom"
refers to the most restrictive legal regime). The efficacy that enforcement provides to foreign law may lead international actors
to conform their actions to the most restrictive legal regimes to
save the transaction costs associated with tailoring their actions to each and every jurisdiction in which they act. Further
consideration, however, suggests that this concern of a race to
the bottom is exaggerated. The concern rests on the assumption
that transaction costs outweigh the costs of voluntarily accepting the strictest regulations. Whether this is true is an empirical matter. There are strong reasons to doubt that this is so as
an across-the-board matter. Consider the extensive U.S. employment regulations, which require that employers make reasonable accommodations for disabled persons, pregnant
women, and older people. These requirements can be expensive. It is doubtful that an American company with manufacturing operations in South America would voluntarily choose to
apply U.S. employment regulations to its Ecuadorian workforce
to save transaction costs.
Even where international actors would opt to conform their
activities to the strictest rule, it must be explained why this is
properly deemed to be a "cost." If a country feels strongly that
parties appropriately subject to its prescriptive jurisdiction
should not conform to a restrictive standard, the country can so
require. Any costs associated with a race to the bottom accordingly turn out to be the compliance costs discussed above. If the
enforcing country is indifferent, on the other hand, it is hard to
see why a private actor's decision to conform its behavior to a
stricter law should matter from the perspective of the international system. The private sector frequently goes beyond what
the law requires, and doing so typically is not deemed to be
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problematic.
Finally, it is important to consider a possible cost that recently has been discussed outside the comity context: the risk of
subjecting international actors to inconsistent and conflicting
regulations. After explaining what this cost is, this Article will
show why it is not properly deemed a cost of enforcing foreign
judgments, making it irrelevant to a Rawlsian analysis. The
risk of inconsistent and conflicting obligations nonetheless
would be relevant under a game theoretic analysis, and would
counsel against enforcement.
Enforcing foreign judgments increases the efficacy of foreign laws, and an international actor will be subject to conflicting obligations if an efficacious foreign law and the domestic
law purport to regulate the identical transaction or occurrence
in ways that cannot be simultaneously satisfied.28 The potential for conflicting obligations is eliminated if one country's law
is effectively disabled, leaving only one country to regulate a
given transaction or occurrence. It is here that the enforcement
of judgments becomes relevant: refusing to enforce a foreign
judgment reduces its efficacy.28 8
It is important not to overstate the problem of inconsistent
obligations. It occurs only infrequently for two reasons. First,
countries' laws typically do not require activities that are prohibited elsewhere. Most frequently, Country A's prohibition
that regulates the activities of a citizen of Country B in Country B disallows the citizen from undertaking an activity that is
287. While there are several patterns such inconsistent obligations can
take, two merit attention here. First, if Country A's law is permissive and
Country B's law is mandatory, then the inconsistent laws will mean that party
C must conform to Country B's mandatory law to avoid liability. Under this
circumstance, party C can comply with both countries' laws, but Country A's
policy of permitting choice is undercut. Second, if both Country A's and Country B's laws are mandatory, and they each require different behaviors, then
party C could be placed in a situation where it is literally impossible to comply
with both countries' laws.
288. Professor Jack Goldsmith has argued against the enforceability of foreign judgments for this very reason. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1216 (1998). Writing in the context of Internet
regulation, Goldsmith has argued that the problem of multiple countries' conflicting regulations is largely a nonissue because countries in which an actor
does not have assets will be unable to enforce their judgments and accordingly
do not have the power to regulate efficaciously. See id. Goldsmith's argument
that conflicting regulations are a nonissue thus rests on the conclusion that
countries in which a defendant's assets are located should not enforce foreign
judgments that issue from countries in which the defendant does not have assets.
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permitted, but not required, in Country B.289 While such a restriction might be said to undermine Country B's policy insofar
as it limits options that Country B is willing to grant its citizens,29 the conflict between the laws of Country A and Country
B is less severe than a situation in which two countries' laws
impose obligations that cannot be simultaneously obeyed. Second, the problem of inconsistent obligations only seldom arises
because international actors' activities frequently are divisible
so that both countries' laws simultaneously can be obeyed. International editions of publications are an example of this: a
party can effectively act one way in Country A and differently
in Country B. Similarly, a manufacturer can produce different
lines of goods that meet the standards of different countries'
tort regimes.
Importantly, where conflicting obligations do arise, the law
governing the enforcement of foreign judgments is not the
proper doctrinal vehicle for addressing them. 291 This is because
enforcement is conceptually inadequate to resolve fairly the
problem of inconsistent regulations under any normative approach aside from game theory. To illustrate, although enforcement is virtually guaranteed if judgment is obtained in a
jurisdiction in which the defendant has assets, the presence of
assets is normatively irrelevant under anything but a game
theoretic approach to the propriety of a country's regulation of
a transaction or occurrence. This shows that the prerequisites
for enforcement simply do not coincide with the considerations
for determining which country's regulations appropriately apply under any normative theory apart from game theory, under
which the enforcing jurisdiction's interests are all that matter.
More generally, enforcement is not the appropriate doctrine to address the problem of inconsistent regulations because inconsistent regulations arise from unsolved problems in
two other legal doctrines. The first is prescriptive jurisdictionthe scope of a country's powers to regulate. The law governing
289. Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993)
(commenting on the conflict between U.S. antitrust laws and British reinsurance laws).
290. See id. at 820-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291. As discussed above, courts confronting a foreign judgment legitimately
can check that the issuing jurisdiction's court properly applied the doctrines of
prescriptive jurisdiction and international choice of law. See supra Part II. Beyond this, however, it is best not to address the problem of inconsistent obligations through the rubric of enforcement, for the reasons discussed above in the
text.
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prescriptive jurisdiction includes the principles that govern the
extent to which one country can regulate extraterritorially. It is
well accepted that countries have some powers to regulate outside their physical borders, but to what extent? Lack of clarity
as to the metes and bounds of these powers is what is largely
responsible for creating inconsistent obligations in the first
place.292 The second doctrine responsible for creating inconsistent obligations is international choice of law-the law that determines which country's law should be applied when two or
more countries have the power to regulate. Solving conflicting
obligations through enforcement doctrines is troublesome because it is the doctrines of prescriptive jurisdiction and international choice of law that are the source of the problem and that
accordingly are the appropriate ways of addressing the predicament of inconsistent obligations.
Furthermore, utilizing the doctrine of enforcement to solve
the problem of inconsistent obligations would systematically
benefit countries with large economies. The opportunity costs of
an international actor keeping assets out of a country with a
large economy may be great, for doing so typically limits access
to the country's market. Since foreigners' assets are likely to be
present, economically important countries typically will be able
to enforce their judgments and hence effectively regulate. Small
countries in which defendants are less likely to have assets,
however, would be unable to enforce their judgments. The size
of a country's economy-and the extent to which potential defendants can afford to keep their assets outside a country's
economy-is normatively irrelevant to resolving which country
should be able to efficaciously regulate under anything apart
from a game theoretic perspective. For example, a company
without assets in Country A might undertake activities outside
Country A that affect that country to such an extent that it has
the right to regulate the company under virtually any norma292. This is not the only source of inconsistent obligations. Many transactions or occurrences involve steps that occur in different countries. Under such
circumstances, inconsistent obligations can arise even if no regulating country
is regulating extraterritorially. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the most
normatively attractive account of prescriptive jurisdiction would lead to a system in which more than one country legitimately had the power to regulate
particular transactions or occurrences. Inconsistent obligations could arise
under such a system of concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction. Sorting out which
obligations should prevail when both jurisdictions' regulations comport with
the rules governing extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction would fall to other
doctrines in such circumstances, such as international choice of law, as is discussed above in the text.
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tive theory of prescriptive jurisdiction. Solving conflicts of obligation by relying on enforcement thus amounts to a bald power
grab, with smaller countries being unable to effectively regulate simply by virtue of their size.
The upshot is this. To the extent that legislative jurisdiction and international choice of law are the appropriate doctrines to manage conflicting obligations from multiple countries, the risk of inconsistent obligations does not constitute a
reason for not enforcing foreign judgments under a Rawlsian
fairness approach. From a game theoretic perspective, however,
nonenforcement can provide a quick fix that systematically
benefits U.S. interests whenever problems of conflicting obligations arise.
To quickly review, the possible costs to the international
system of enforcing foreign judgments dissolve upon closer inspection under a Rawlsian analysis. Under such an approach,
considerations from the vantage point of the international system all counsel in favor of the enforcement of foreign judgments. On the other hand, costs to the international system
that are then borne by individual states-such as increased
transaction costs and the risk of inconsistent obligationscounsel against enforcement under a game theoretic approach.
As with so many other issues concerning the enforcement of
foreign judgments, determining the relevance of enforcement's
consequences vis-&-vis the international system turns on the
analyst's ante-legal political preferences.
V. SYNTHESIS AND APPLICATIONS
This final Part V synthesizes the aforementioned considerations into a workable framework for determining whether
un-American judgments should be enforced and then applies
the framework to the cases examined in Part I where American
courts categorically refused to enforce un-American judgments
on the mistaken belief that it would be unconstitutional for
them to do so.
A. THE PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: A SYNTHESIS

The table on the following page summarizes how each approach-comity, game theory, and Rawlsian political theoryanalyzes the consequences of enforcement decisions that are
visited upon each affected entity. The salience of these considerations is not dependent upon which branch of government ultimately generates an enforcement policy.
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Comity (A)
Enforce (principles of
res judicata).

Game Theory (B)
Irrelevant,

Rawls (C)
Same as 1A, with
one additional
check: did Issuing
Country have
prescriptive
jurisdiction?

Defendant (2)

If Issuing Country
properly had personal
jurisdiction, then it is
fair to subject even a
U.S. citizen to unAmerican judgments
if there has been
meaningful consent.

Irrelevant.

Same as 2A.

Issuing
Country
(foreign
country) (3)

Enforce due to the
respect due a
sovereignundertheorized.

Enforcing
Country
(United
States) (4)

No "reciprocity
requirement."
Enforce to advance
separation of powers
ideal of not
interfering with
foreign policy, but do
not enforce if foreign
judgment is
.repugnant" to
American public
policy. This "public
policy" exception is
undertheorized.

I
, unless
advantageous
from U.S.
perspective (e.g.,
promotes political
stability),
The sole
consideration is
"tailored
reciprocity"--do
not enforce unAmerican
judgments under
current
conditions, unless
the country
broadly enforces
U.S. judgments or
it is otherwise in
U.S. interests to
enforce.

No "reciprocity
requirement." If
the foreign
judgment is
consistent with the
international
limits on
legislative
jurisdiction and
choice of law, and
if the law is
consistent with a
liberal or decent
hierarchical
society, then
enforce if not
enforcing would
harm the Issuing
Country's culture
more than
enforcing would
harm U.S. culture
(i.e., international
comparative
impairment).

International
System (5)

Enforce, because it
facilitates
international
transactions,
Overlooked to date.

Irrelevant, unless
advantageous
from U.S.
perspective.
A cost counseling
against
enforcement.
A cost counseling
against
enforcement,

Same as 5A

Plaintiff (1)

Transaction
Costs (5.1)
Inconsistent
Obligations
(5.2)

Overlooked to date.

Worthwhile cost.

Solve at source of
problem to avoid
systematic
unfairness to
smaller economies.
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1. Overview: A Comparison
The analysis is most streamlined under a game theoretic
approach. If an American court is asked to enforce an unAmerican judgment from a foreign country that does not enforce many U.S. judgments due to the foreign country's public
policy exception (or its doctrinal analogue), then game theory
counsels against enforcement unless there are overriding U.S.
interests to do otherwise. Such interests could include the aim
of promoting political stability in the foreign country or ensuring that a prevailing U.S. plaintiff is able to collect against a
foreign citizen's assets that happen to be situated in the United
States. Generally speaking, however, game theory would counsel against enforcing un-American judgments until such time
as the foreign country enforces U.S. judgments without invoking the public policy exception. This is "tailored reciprocity."
Comity and Rawlsian analysis diverge significantly from
game theory but themselves share much in common. As shown
in the chart on the previous page, the analysis is identical, or
virtually identical, at several junctures: 1A=IC, 2A=2C, and
5A=5C. Furthermore, both doctrines reject any reciprocity
requirement.
Though the comity case law has identified most of the potentially affected entities, its theoretical underpinnings are not
sufficiently developed to explain current black letter doctrine.
Nor is comity a sufficiently robust concept to weigh each entity's interests when enforcement benefits some but harms others. Rawlsian analysis is one plausible theoretical framework
that can answer these questions. The Rawlsian approach explains why fairness to the parties is important, why a party can
meaningfully consent to be bound by an un-American law, and
why there rightfully is no reciprocity requirement.
Rawlsian analysis, however, counsels for the reworking of
certain aspects of contemporary comity doctrine. Under a
Rawlsian analysis, the distinction between the issuing and enforcing countries' interests dissolves (hence the erasure of the
line between rows three and four in column C), and the goal is
to minimize cultural costs among liberal and decent hierarchical societies. Procedurally, this means that the Issuing Country's judgment must be consistent with international limitations on the exercise of legislative jurisdiction and choice of
law.293 Substantively, this means that rather than utilizing a
293.

These requirements also ensure that enforcement is fair from the per-
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unilateralist public policy exception that only asks whether a
foreign judgment is "repugnant" to American culture, the law
should utilize an international comparative impairment approach and refuse to enforce only those foreign judgments that
reflect the problematic laws of outlaw states, societies burdened
by unfavorable conditions, and benevolent absolutisms.
2. Synthesis
There is no need to reiterate the very simple doctrinal test
described above that follows from a game theoretic approach.
The analysis under either comity or a Rawlsian approach, however, is more complex. Under both comity and a Rawlsian approach, the threshold inquiry should fix on whether enforcement is fair from the perspective of the defendant. Did the
issuing country properly exercise personal and legislative jurisdiction?29 If not, the foreign judgment should not be enforced
as a categorical matter. If so, did the party against whom enforcement is sought meaningfully consent to being bound by the
un-American law? The question is readily resolved in the affirmative when the party is a citizen of the foreign country from
whose court the judgment issued. Furthermore, American citizens can meaningfully consent to be bound by foreign laws that
spective of the victorious party that is seeking enforcement.
294. An important question is whether an American court should utilize
U.S. constitutional standards when analyzing whether the foreign jurisdiction
properly exercised adjudicatory and legislative jurisdiction or a more lenient
standard that respects reasonable foreign doctrines. Rawlsian principles of
equality and nonintervention suggest the latter. Game theory is more openended. If the latter approach were not injurious to American interests, game
theory would offer no objection. To the extent American interests were deemed
to be harmed by an American court applying non-American jurisdictional
standards, however, game theory would argue in favor of applying American
doctrine.
The approach suggested above in the text varies from the practice under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, under which states are bound by the determination of a sister state's court that it had jurisdiction. See Durfee v. Duke,
375 U.S. 106 (1963). There are good reasons to give courts greater leeway to
assess the jurisdictional determinations of foreign courts. Sister states share a
common political culture in ways that American and foreign courts do not, and
they typically interact with one another with greater frequency than do
American and foreign courts. Such commonality and frequent intercourse may
help ensure the reasonableness of their jurisdictional determinations. Furthermore, domestically there always remains a disinterested third party to
ensure the fairness of the issuing state's jurisdictional determination: the Supreme Court. Depriving American courts of the power to inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction would wholly eliminate any outside check on the foreign court.
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American polities could not have enacted due to constitutional
constraints. 295
The next set of questions concerns the relative interests of
the issuing and enforcing countries. Comity and Rawlsian political theory answer the question differently. As a threshold
matter, comity invokes the undertheorized public policy exception and asks whether the foreign law embodied in the judgment is "repugnant" to American policy. Under a Rawlsian approach the threshold question, by contrast, is whether the
foreign law embodied in the judgment reflects values consistent
with liberal or decent hierarchical societies. If not, the judgment categorically should not be enforced.2 96
If the threshold requirement is met, comity almost automatically finds that the issuing country has a sovereign interest in having its judgment enforced. A Rawlsian approach, by
contrast, invites comparative impairment analysis that is difficult for courts to make, and for that reason is best left to the
political branches. In fact, it is very difficult for even the executive and legislative branches to make such cross-country determinations. The best way to answer such questions likely is
through ex ante negotiations via treaties or executive agreements. Absent executive or legislative involvement, courts
nonetheless can muddle through, much as they do when they
assess the policies behind statutes and engage in balancing incommensurables in litigations that concern purely domestic
matters.297
The final set of considerations concerns the international
system. To date, the comity case law has assumed that enforcement is beneficial to the international system. The case
law, however, has not taken account of several costs to the system that enforcement imposes: transaction costs of compliance
with multiple countries' laws and the possibility of inconsistent
and conflicting obligations. These costs do not counsel against
enforcement under a Rawlsian framework. It is unclear how
they would be treated under comity's undertheorized approach.
In short, how the enforcement of un-American judgments
is analyzed ultimately turns on the analyst's ante-legal political
commitments. Two plausible approaches to international relations-game theory and Rawlsian political theory-generate

295.
296.
297.

See supra notes 201-55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
See Scharffs, supra note 182, at 1374.
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very different frameworks for answering enforcement questions. Involving competing value judgments, as well as matters
of foreign affairs, enforcement determinations are best made by
the more political branches of government, not by courts.
B. SOME APPLICATIONS
This final section revisits the cases analyzed earlier in
which American courts refused to enforce un-American judgments on the view that the First Amendment precluded enforcement of such judgments."' Analysis from a game theoretic
perspective is simple: none of the foreign judgments should
have been enforced because both England and France have refused to enforce many American judgments. based
rm on their do299
mestic equivalents of public policy exceptions. What follows is
the more complex analysis entailed by either a comity or a
Rawlsian approach. All that follows is unaffected by which
branch
of government ultimately formulates enforcement pol3°
icy.
i .300
1. Telnikoff

301

This is the easiest case to resolve. Had the court engaged
in an ordinary comity analysis rather than its misplaced constitutional frolic, it probably would have decided to enforce the
foreign judgment. A Rawlsian analysis clearly concludes that
enforcement would have been proper.
a. The Parties
Comity and Rawlsian analysis are identical as regards the
determination of whether enforcing an un-American judgment
is fair to the parties, and both would conclude that enforcement

298. See supra Part I.
299. For example, England's Protection and Trading Interests Act of 1980
"denies recognition to antitrust judgments and, in certain circumstances, allows the defendant in the foreign proceeding to recover from the plaintiffs
British assets any treble damages he has had to pay." SCOLES ET AL., supra
note 52, at 1195. French law also contains a public policy provision that has
been relied upon in respect of American foreign judgments, which has been
given broad application. Id. at 1196 & n.11.
300. The sole exception is the separation of powers consideration pointed to
under comity that favors enforcement to avoid judicial interference with executive branch formulation of foreign policy. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
301. Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
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would have been fair to the parties in the Telnikoff case.30 ' First
consider the victorious plaintiff, Mr. Telnikoff. He obtained
judgment after having fully litigated the matter in England,
and English trial procedures were not alleged to have been unfair. For these reasons, enforcement would have been fair from
the perspective of the plaintiff.303
Next, consider matters from the vantage point of the losing
party, Mr. Matusevitch. At the time he published his letter in
an English newspaper, Matusevitch was a long-term resident of
England. °4 For this reason, Matusevitch meaningfully consented to being governed by English libel law, and England
properly exercised adjudicatory and legislative jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the substantive provisions of English law do not
exceed the limits to which American courts should permit a
person to consent.3 5 English libel law is no more restrictive
than domestic contractual limits on speech that American
courts regularly have upheld. 36 For these reasons, it would not
be unfair from the perspective of Mr. Matusevitch for an
American court to enforce the English judgment, even though
an American polity could not have enacted the type of libel law
on which the judgment was based.30 7
b. The Countries
Both comity and Rawlsian analysis first would inquire
whether, as a threshold matter, the English law on which the
judgment was based is a type of law that an American court
categorically should not enforce. Under comity, the question is
whether English libel standards are so "repugnant" to Ameri3 0 8 Comity's undercan standards as to require nonenforcement.
theorized character does not permit a definitive answer, 309 but I
would suggest that once the canard of unconstitutionality has
been discarded, it is reasonable to conclude that the English
302. See supra Parts II.A, III.C.1.
.
303. See supra Part IV
304. See Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 232.
305. See, e.g., State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858, 871 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding settlement agreement under which an American citizen agreed not to
publicly criticize a controversial psychotherapy technique); see also Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part II.B.2.c).
306. See Noah, 9 P.3d at 871.
307. See supra Part IV.A.2 (detailing the analysis relevant to a "losing
party").
308. See supra Part II.A.
309. See supra Part II.C.
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rule at issue here, that false published statements that adversely affect reputation are prima facie defamatory, simply
does not qualify as sufficiently "repugnant" to merit nonenforcement. Indeed, prior to the 1960s there were jurisdictions in
the United States that had such laws; such laws in fact were
the predicate for rulings in cases such as New York Times v.
Sullivan.31 ° England's defamation law incontrovertibly differs
from what is required by today's First Amendment jurisprudence, but that alone hardly makes the English law "repugnant." On the other hand, the public policy exception does not
have sufficient theoretical resources to contradict a claim to the
contrary. In the end, what constitutes "repugnance" for pur311
poses of comity accordingly is indeterminate.
A Rawlsian analysis provides a more definitive answer. 312
Although U.S. and English judgments differ as regards the
scope accorded to free expression, the English law is the product of a liberal democracy. Because England is neither an outlaw state nor a benevolent absolutism, the principles of equality and nonintervention ought to govern U.S. interactions with
her. Accomplishing this goal entails respecting the political
choice made by English culture, not categorically refusing to
enforce a foreign judgment based on the English law simply because the foreign law does not coincide with American First
Amendment doctrine.
Assuming that the comity analysis concluded that the English judgment survived the threshold question, comity next
would ask whether England had a legitimate sovereign interest
in the judgment's enforcement. The conclusion would be in the
affirmative because an English court had issued a final judgment following lengthy adjudication that included two jury trials and an appeal. Apart from the public policy analysis mentioned above, standard comity analysis does not consider other
potential costs to the Enforcing Country that enforcement
might entail.
Rawlsian analysis would evaluate the interests of England
and the United States by considering the cultural costs of enforcement and nonenforcement rather than by invoking the
concept of sovereignty. The English libel law reflected an important English public policy: the honor of persons should be

310. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
311. See supra Part II.C.
312. See supra Part III.C.
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protected against defamation, and public figures should have
the same protections against libel that are enjoyed by private
citizens. A U.S. policy of nonenforcement could invite largescale evasion of English libel law over time.
The United States, on the other hand, had virtually no interest in not enforcing the English judgment because domestic
costs of enforcement would have been negligible. Though the
First Amendment precludes an American polity from enacting
the English libel law, enforcing the judgment would not have
endangered this country's cultural commitment to First
Amendment values. Those values are quite robust. Moreover, a
strong argument can be made that enforcing the foreign judgment would not constitute a public expression of governmental
support for the substantive law underlying the judgment.
American courts apply the laws of other sovereigns all the time,
and when they do so it is popularly understood that they are
merely doing their job as courts, not that they are giving public
support to the substantive provisions they happen to be applying.313 Enforcing the British judgment accordingly would not
have had a social meaning in the United States that would
have imperiled American culture. For these reasons, an international comparative impairment analysis suggests that
nonenforcement was more damaging to English culture than
enforcement would have been to American culture.
c.

InternationalSystem

Both comity and Rawlsian analysis lead to the conclusion
that enforcing the judgment in Telnikoff would have been beneficial to the international system. A strong pattern of enforcement of foreign judgments increases predictability and eliminates
duplicative
proceedings,
thereby
encouraging
international business. Though the comity case law to date has
not considered the possibility that enforcement could impose
transaction costs and aggravate the problem of inconsistent
and conflicting obligations, the Telnikoff scenario does not
threaten to create any such costs since the English regulation
in that case applied to an English citizen's activities in England. In any event, any such costs would not be relevant to a
Rawlsian analysis, as explained above, for people in the second
original position would decide that protecting culture trumps

313.

See supra note 283.
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314
financial costs.

2. Bachchan1 5
The Bachchan case is harder than Telnikoff because enforcing the foreign judgment would have imposed some domestic costs, possibly including some deleterious effects on American culture. Balancing these costs against the interests of
England, the parties, and the international system is an act of
commensurating incommensurables that is political in character. This Article's framework elucidates the array of relevant
considerations and in so doing makes it clear that additional
information was needed to make an informed enforcement determination. Under a plausible set of factual assumptions,
however, the British judgment should have been enforced under either a comity or Rawlsian approach. The judgment would
not be enforced under a game theoretic approach, however, for
the reasons elucidated above.
a. The Parties
In an analysis that is common to both comity and Rawlsian
political theory, it can be shown that enforcing the judgment
would have been fair from the perspective of the parties.1 6 The
victorious plaintiff resided in England and was libeled by a report that appeared in a newspaper there. 3 7 There were no suggestions that the English trial was procedurally unfair. Enforcement accordingly would have been fair from the
perspective of the plaintiff.
It also would have been fair from the perspective of the losing defendant, India Abroad, to enforce the judgment. Although
India Abroad was a New York news service, it had a subsidiary
in England that had printed and distributed the offending publication in England.3 8 By setting up a subsidiary in England, it
is fair to say that India Abroad meaningfully consented to being governed by English law with regard to activities that the
company undertook in England and had effects in England. As
discussed in relation to Telnikoff,3 9 it cannot plausibly be said
314.
315.
1992).
316.
317.
318.
319.

See supra Part III.C.
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct.
See supra Part V.A.
Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
See supra Part V.B.I.a.
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that the libel law in question is a substantive limitation to
which American citizens ought not be permitted to consent. For
these reasons, it would not have been unfair to enforce the British judgment against the American corporation, even though
the judgment was based on a law that the Constitution would
have prevented an American polity from enacting.
b.

The Countries

Insofar as the law in Bachchan is the same as what was at
issue in Telnikoff, the analysis above with regard to the threshold determination and England's interests is identical to what
was elucidated above. The impact on the United States of enforcing the judgment in Bachchan, however, is more complex.
The relevance of the effects is a function of the analyst's antelegal commitments.
Enforcing the judgment in Bachchan would have imposed
going-forward business costs on American corporations. Because India Abroad's New York headquarters both transmitted
news reports abroad and printed newspapers in the United
States and England, 320 an enforceable judgment would have
meant that India Abroad would have had to treat its domestic
and foreign publications differently in the future. Some information that was legally published in its New York newspaper
would run afoul of English legal requirements. India Abroad
would then have had four options: it could have (1) published
an international edition that was tailored to foreign legal requirements; (2) stopped publishing in England; (3) created only
a single publication that complied with the most restrictive legal requirements, thereby watering down the information provided to American citizens; or (4) gone out of business.321
The four possible options entail varying proportions of two
types of costs: financial costs that would be absorbed by the
company and information costs that might be imposed on the
American public. Though the comity case law to date has not
320. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
321. A fine student note provides a similar breakdown of the options faced
by India Abroad. See Jeremy Maltby, Note, Juggling Comity and SelfGovernment: The Enforcement of ForeignLibel Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1978, 1982 (1994). The note analyzes these costs much differently than this Article does, however. See id. at 1982-83. Among other things,
the note concludes that these costs trigger constitutional concerns. See id. I
have explained in another piece why enforcing un-American judgments does
not implicate the Constitution. See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part
II).
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taken account of financial costs in determining whether a foreign law triggers the public policy exception, comity's undertheorized character provides no certainty that such costs will
remain outside of the exception's purview. It is clear that financial costs are irrelevant under a Rawlsian analysis. Under both
comity and Rawlsian approaches, however, information costs
are relevant. Information costs fall naturally under a public
policy exception analysis, and they constitute a cultural cost
under a Rawlsian approach. For these reasons, it is worthwhile
inquiring further into each of the four possible responses India
Abroad would have had under a regime in which un-American
judgments were enforced.
Consider first the option of publishing an international edition. To be sure, such a choice would impose a genuine financial
cost, particularly for a publisher of modest size; India Abroad is
no Time or Newsweek. But it is important not to exaggerate
these costs. The newspaper that India Abroad published in
England already was not identical to its New York publication,
for advertisements were tailored to the different audiences. 322
The requirement to abide by English libel laws would have imposed costs that differed in degree, but not in kind, from costs
that IndiaAbroad already incurred.
Would India Abroad have chosen to produce a special edition for England that omitted passages or articles that would
have run afoul of English libel law? The choice presumably
would have been made on the basis of some combination of financial considerations and publishing principles. For example,
although publishing an international edition would have eaten
into India Abroad's profits, it is possible that publishing abroad
still would have been profit-generating. Indeed, the fact that
Indian Abroad already produced a publication tailored to England suggests the plausibility of this prospect. 3 3 Alternatively,
even if generating a single edition that omitted material offensive to English law might have been more profitable, the company's publishing ethic might have led it to publish an interna322. Telephone Interview with Sales Representative Shahnaz, India
Abroad Publications, Inc. (June 6, 2002) (explaining that the United States
and United Kingdom editions have differences including, but not limited to,
different advertisements that appear in each); see also India Abroad,
Classifieds,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
Rediff.com
at
http://shopping.rediff.com/shoppingia-classfaq_ind.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2004) (indicating that ads can be placed in various local editions, or nationally).
323. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
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tional edition so it could communicate as much as possible to
its American audience. Information about India Abroad's costs
and publishing ethics accordingly would have been legally relevant to analyzing the enforcement question under a Rawlsian
approach.
The question then becomes how the possible domestic costs
should be harmonized with the competing interests of the parties and England. This ultimately is a political determination.
It is worth noting, however, that the level of difficulty posed by
this question is a function of facts. Consider first the possibility
that publishing an international edition would have been profitable, meaning that compliance simply would have diminished
India Abroad's profit margin. Although this would impose no
legitimate costs on America's culture, 324 it nonetheless would
exact a real financial cost on an American corporation. It is unclear how comity would treat this, but preservation of culture
takes precedence over profits under a Rawlsian analysis, for
persons in the second original position would not prioritize
profits over the protection of acceptable cultures.
Next, consider the possibility that the duty to comply with
English law would lead India Abroad to maintain its full
American publication but to discontinue publishing in England
altogether. 5 The domestic costs incurred under this outcome
would not appear to be appreciably different from the analysis

324. I say "legitimate" so as to exclude any claim that American culture is
advanced by publishing materials in England that are consonant with American free speech values but that violate the dignity norms that motivate English libel law. See Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 933, 933-38 (1996) (explaining that "defamation
laws reflect the relative weight that society assigns to certain fundamental but
conflicting values and introducing English libel law"). Any such purported
hegemonic American political cultural "value" would be illegitimate on many
grounds. For example, it would violate norms of noninterference that are incorporated in international law. In Rawlsian terms, it would violate the principle of equality that appropriately applies to liberal societies and decent hierarchical societies. See supra Part IV.C.3. Such principles do not apply to
outlaw states or benevolent absolutisms, which explains why Rawlsian principles would not preclude Voice of America-type activities. See supra Part
IV.C.3.
325. India Abroad might elect this rather than publishing only a single
edition that conformed to British libel standards for several reasons. It might
face media competition in the United States and fear that it would lose readership by restricting its news coverage. Alternatively, it might be committed
on the basis of publishing principles to keeping its American readers maximally informed.
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immediately above.326
The hardest cases would be if the duty to comply with English law led India Abroad to publish only a single "watered
down" edition that excluded certain news coverage so as to
comply with the most restrictive law (i.e., English law),327 or to
go out of business altogether. Either would impose a genuine
cost on American culture, for it would mean that enforcing the
foreign judgment would diminish the information available to
American citizens. This scenario poses a bona fide dilemma, for
not enforcing such judgments would effectively immunize
American publishers from more restrictive foreign laws and
thereby impose costs on the foreign culture. Comity is not sufficiently theoretically developed to answer how such a dilemma
should be resolved. Under a Rawlsian analysis, the question
would be whether enforcement would impose greater cost on
American culture than nonenforcement would put on English
culture. It would be best to encourage the countries to negotiate
such a tradeoff in an ex ante manner by means of an executive
agreement or treaty. If the legislative and executive branches
did not step in to formulate an enforcement policy but left it to
the courts, a Rawlsian analysis suggests that more information
is necessary to make a decision. It is plausible that even publications of relatively modest size would elect to publish international editions and that there would be little if no domestic information costs. Not enforcing the judgment, on the other hand,
would open the door to large-scale circumvention of English
law, thereby threatening to undermine the cultural norms that
English libel law sought to advance.
c.

InternationalSystem

For the most part, the interests of the international system
point in favor of enforcement insofar as the enforcement of for326. But compare Molly S. Van Houweling, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, the FirstAmendment, and Internet Speech: Notes for the Next Yahoo! v.
LICRA, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697, 714-15 (2003) (arguing that speech is a
.network good" whose value increases with the number of speakers), with infra note 360 (asking whether there may be diminishing marginal returns to
the size of speech networks). To the extent there were domestic consequences
to a decision by India Abroad not to publish internationally due to speech's
character as a network good, the second possibility discussed above in the text
would not be identical to the first possibility. While the quantum of the benefit
of the increased network size is not likely to be significant, how such domestic
costs should be weighed would appear to be a political determination.
327. See Maltby, supra note 321, at 1982.
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eign judgments generally leads to stability and predictability.
Unlike Telnikoff, however, Bachchan concerns a multinational
corporation and contemplates that different countries' laws
might apply to the corporation's operations in different countries. This generates the transaction
costs of tailoring policies
3281
to different countries' laws. Compliance costs have not to date
been taken into account under a comity analysis, though comity's uncertain character by no means guarantees that they
won't be in the future. Such costs are not relevant, however,
under a Rawlsian analysis.
3. Yahoo!

329

The Yahoo! case is more difficult than either Bachchan or
Telnikoff. Under both comity and a Rawlsian approach, the correct outcome turns on contested technological considerations
and the faith that one places in continued technological developments. Game theory suggests the judgment should not have
been enforced because France does not enforce many American
judgments.
a. The Parties
It would appear that enforcing the judgment would have
been fair from the perspective of the parties. The victorious
plaintiffs resided in France, 330 and there was no suggestion that
the French trial was procedurally unfair.33' Enforcement accordingly would have been fair from the vantage point of the
plaintiff.
It also would have been fair from the perspective of the losing defendant Yahoo! to enforce the judgment. Although Yahoo!
operated its Web site from the United States and had neither
hardare
or significant assets
sset in332.
hardware nor
in France, it apparently customized its advertisement banners so that persons who accessed the site from France saw French advertisements that

328. The option of publishing an international edition, however, forecloses
the possibility that the company might be subject to inconsistent obligations.
329. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
330. See id. at 1183.
331. See id. at 1188-89.
332. For an illuminating account of some of the financial assets that Yahoo!
could be said to have held in France, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261, 269 (2002).
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were tailored to a French audience.33 3 Furthermore, Yahoo! had
a "French subsidiary in which it own[ed] a 70% ownership
stake" and "exerted substantial control over this subsidiary,
dictating some of the links and content of the site and requiring
the subsidiary to maintain links to its United States based
site. "0 34 Moreover, Yahoo! routinely profiled French users in order to target them with advertisements written in French.335

These facts establish that Yahoo!.com targeted business to
France. Accordingly, it is not unfair to require Yahoo! to abide
by French laws that comply with customary international law
limits on prescriptive jurisdiction. This conclusion is buttressed
by recent American decisions finding personal jurisdiction
where a defendant targets forum residents or intends an effect
in the forum state.336 On the other hand, if Yahoo!.com had not
customized its banners, it would have been far more difficult to
conclude that the company had meaningfully consented to
French law. Merely posting a Web site that can be visited any-

where in the world probably does not constitute meaningful
consent to abide by the laws of all countries. 37 The bulk of
American case law supports this point.338
333. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F.
Supp. 2d. 1181, 1191 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
334. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 311, 518 (2002).
335. Id.
336. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22
(9th Cir. 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir.
1996) (finding personal jurisdiction in Ohio because the defendant "deliberately set in motion an ongoing marketing relationship with CompuServe, and
he should have reasonably foreseen that doing so would have consequences in
Ohio").
337. This preliminary conclusion, however, may well be a function of technology. For example, posting alone perhaps would constitute purposeful
availment everywhere if there existed simple technology that a poster could
use that permitted geographical targeting. I leave this point for another day.
338. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) ("[A] finding of personal jurisdiction... based on
an Internet web site would mean that there would be nationwide (indeed,
worldwide) personal jurisdiction over anyone and everyone who establishes an
Internet web site. Such nationwide jurisdiction is not consistent with traditional personal jurisdiction case law ....

"); see also Remick v. Manfredy, 238

F.3d 248, 259 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001); GTE New Media Serv., Inc. v. BellSouth
Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190
F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999); 3D Syst., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160
F.3d 1373, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25,
29 (2d Cir. 1997); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that advertising on the Internet alone is not sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F.
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The final check to ensure the fairness of applying the foreign judgment to an American citizen is to determine whether
the foreign law is the sort of regulation to which an American
citizen paternalistically should not be permitted to consent. It
is hard to conclude that France's hate speech law so qualifies.
American courts have regularly upheld settlement agreements
among Americans that contractually limit speech that virtually
everyone would agree is more valuable than the speech curtailed by France's law.339
b. The Countries and the InternationalSystem
The threshold analysis under comity would ask whether
France's hate speech law is repugnant to American society.
Once again, comity's lack of theoretical sophistication prevents
a principled and predictable answer to the question.
The fact that regulating hate speech is so contested within
American political culture-many mainstream commentators
think such regulations should be constitutional 340-arguably
suggests that such regulations are not "repugnant" to American
public policy, even if they are not consistent with contemporary
First Amendment doctrine. The analysis is completely determinate, however, under a Rawlsian approach: France's law
emerges from a liberal democratic society and does not reflect
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a Web site that "does little
more than make information available to those who are interested in it" does
not establish personal jurisdiction). But see Telco Communications v. An Apple
a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 406-07 (E.D. Va. 1997); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161-64 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that advertising on
Web site and listing a toll-free number establishes personal jurisdiction); State
ex rel Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997), affd 576 N.W. 2d 747 (Minn. 1998); cf. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L.
Bean Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that operation of a
virtual store in California generated jurisdiction, whereas a business that was
not registered or licensed in California and targeting no advertising toward
the state would not).
339. See, e.g., State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
340.

See, e.g., ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE

SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 144 (2002); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
106 HARV. L. REV.124, 155-60 (1992); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV.C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 133, 172-79 (1982); Mary J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357 (1989);
john a. powell, As Justice Requires /Permits: The Delimitation of Harmful
Speech in a Democratic Society, 16 LAW & INEQ. 97, 101 (1998); Steven H.
Shiffrin, Racist Speech, OutsiderJurisprudence,and the Meaning of America,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 86 (1994).
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values found only in outlaw states, societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, or benevolent absolutisms. Under a Rawlsian analysis, the French law accordingly deserves respect.
Persons in the second original position, opting for culturepreserving rules, would not conclude that foreign judgments
based on such laws categorically should not be enforced.
The next questions concern the nature of France's interests. It cannot be disputed that Yahoo!'s activities undermined
the efficacy of the French law that proscribed the visualization
of Nazi memorabilia for purposes of commerce.34' One of the
several hard questions presented by the Yahoo! case is whether
France had the power to regulate a non-national's out-ofcountry activities. Stated differently, was France's exercise of
regulatory jurisdiction consistent with the customary international law doctrines that govern the scope of extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction? 4 2 The French regulation (as applied to
Yahoo) is premised on one of the bases of prescriptive jurisdiction whose scope is subject to deep disagreement across countries: the so-called effects doctrine. For the reasons described
below, however, there is a strong basis for concluding that
France's interests were legitimate under this criterion.
Under the effects doctrine, regulatory power is based not
on the physical location of the regulated behavior or the citizenship of the regulated party, but on the fact that a noncitizen's out-of-country activities have effects on the regulating
country. The legitimacy of premising prescriptive jurisdiction
on effects is widely acknowledged by the international community,3 3 but there is a significant difference of opinion across
countries with regard to how serious the effects must be and
341. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme,
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
342. The analysis here will not second-guess the French court's determination that France had the power as a matter of internal French law to regulate
Yahoo!.
343. See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9, at 19
(Sept. 7), reprinted in 2 WORLD COURT REPORTS 35 (Manley 0. Hudson ed.,
1935).

Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that states
may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, [international law] leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules ....
Id. See generally Gary B. Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of
U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 1, 21-26 (1992) (discussing the development of the effects doctrine in international law).
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whether there is some additional "reasonableness" requirement.344 International agreement concerning the appropriate
scope of the effects doctrine is not necessary, however, to formulate a workable policy as regards the enforcement of foreign
judgments. Although the appropriate bounds of the effects doctrine are still unsettled as a matter of international law, principles of fairness suggest that when deciding whether to enforce
the foreign judgment, the United States should determine the
legitimacy of other countries' assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction by no stricter a standard than the United States uses to
judge its own powers.345 The second original position's veil of
ignorance precludes the selection of more expansive powers for
one's own country than for other countries. 346
Under this standard, France's regulation of Yahoo! is legitimate. The United States has adopted a broad understanding of the effects doctrine, applying American antitrust, intellectual property, and securities law to the out-of-state activities
47 though American
of noncitizens.A
courts have not adopted a
344. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(1)
(1986) ("[A) state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law ...when the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."); THE INT'L CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, supra note 260, at 36-40.
345. As discussed above, this step in the analysis is relevant only if the issuing country's exercise of regulatory jurisdiction is consistent with the issuing country's internal law. See supra note 199.
346. To be sure, the second original position does not demand that all countries be treated identically in all circumstances; as discussed above, for instance, a Rawlsian analysis rejects the doctrine of reciprocity. See supra note
168. Such differential treatment is a consequence of the Rawlsian principle of
equality, which demands tailored treatment for peoples that are relevantly
different. France and the United States do not appear to be relevantly different, however, with respect to the appropriate scope of legislative jurisdiction.
For this reason, a Rawlsian analysis suggests that an American court should
analyze the legitimacy of France's exercise of legislation jurisdiction by no
stricter a standard than it would examine the legitimacy of Congress's exercise
of legislative jurisdiction.
347. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99
(1993) (applying United States antitrust law to British reinsurance companies
without a United States presence). See generally Born, supra note 343, at 2954 (discussing the gradual erosion of the "territoriality presumption" in
American courts). Germany and the European Union have adopted similarly
broad formulations of the effects doctrine, whereas the United Kingdom has a
narrower doctrine that requires an element of the offense to have occurred
within British territory. THE INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 260,
at 37.
One might object that because the powers of the United States Congress
are delimited by the United States Constitution but not by principles of international law, see PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED STATES
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singular formulation applicable across all substantive contexts
348
to explain when U.S. legislation can apply extraterritorially,

there are some patterns. Typically there must be a "substantial" harm to United States interests. 49 There also typically is
an intentionality requirement, although courts have not been
consistent as to whether foreseeability alone suffices or
whether, as a recent Supreme Court decision in the antitrust

context suggests,5' a defendant must have intended to cause
the effect experienced in the United States.35 The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law adopts a similar approach,
with the exception that it deploys an objective test.35 It permits
regulation of conduct outside a country's territory "that has or
is intended to have substantial effect within its territory,"3 53

subject to a reasonableness requirement .3 54
France's

regulation

of Yahoo! satisfies

all these

ap-

proaches. Yahoo!'s actions had significant effects in France insofar as they undermined the efficacy of an important public
law. To the extent intentionality is required, Yahoo!'s targeting
of the French market by tailoring its banners would likely sufFOREIGN RELATIONS LAw 102 (2002), merely analyzing U.S. legislation does
not necessarily inform a person of the U.S. conception of the scope of the effects doctrine. After all, a piece of legislation could represent Congress's decision to legislate in contravention of international law rather than an expression of Congress's understanding of the scope of the effects principle. In
practice, however, surveying American legislation is a good index of the U.S.
view concerning the limits of prescriptive jurisdiction. There is a longstanding
canon of judicial construction under which acts of Congress are to be construed
if possible so as not to violate international law, which reflects a true reluctance on the part of Congress to legislate in violation of international law. See
id. at 102.
348. Compare Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 796 ("[Tjhe Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States."), with Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-89 (1952) (considering purposes underlying the
Lanham Act, effects of out-of-state conduct within the United States, defendant's nationality and residence, and absence of conflict between U.S. and foreign law before determining that U.S. law applied extraterritorially), and Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984)
(construing the effects test as inquiring "whether conduct occurring in foreign
countries had caused foreseeable and substantial harm to interests in the
United States").
349. See, e.g., Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108.
350. Hartford FireIns., 509 U.S. at 796.
351. See supra note 348 (discussing HartfordFire Insurance).
352. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(1)
(1986).
353. Id. § 402(1)(c).
354. See id. § 403(1).
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fice. The French regulation also would likely survive the Restatement's "reasonableness" requirement. A crucial consideration is the likelihood of conflict with another state's laws, and a
majority of the Supreme Court has ruled that this conflict determination turns on whether "'a person subject to regulation
by two states can comply with the laws of both.' 355 There is no
question that the French law would pass muster under this
understanding of the black letter law, for U.S. law does not
mandate that Yahoo! make the auction site available. There are
good reasons, however, to believe that the Supreme Court's approach omits some conflicts that are relevant to determining
whether a country's regulation is reasonable. 56 A more plausible conception of conflict instead would look to whether compliance with the foreign law would undermine legitimate domestic
policy. The answer to this question turns primarily on technology. If, as the French court held, Yahoo! has the technology to
limit only computers in France from accessing the proscribed
auction sites such that complying with French law would not
affect the material available outside of France, it is hard to see
why application of the French law would be unreasonable.3 57
The analysis here shows why this technological issue was crucial to a proper legal determination, contrary to the United
States district court's averments.358
Having shown that France's exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in respect to Yahoo!.com likely is consistent with the
U.S. view of the scope of the effects doctrine and accordingly is
legitimate from the U.S. perspective, the next inquiry concerns
the effects that enforcement would have on the United States.
Under the international comparative impairment approach
suggested by a Rawlsian analysis, the costs to France of not enforcing would have to be compared to the costs to the United
States of enforcing. The French court's order required Yahoo! to
configure computers that were located in the United States so
that people in France could not access the Nazi auction sites.35 9
355. HartfordFire Ins., 509 U.S. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 cmt. e (1986)).
356. See id. at 820-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, JurisdictionalIssues Before National Courts: The Insurance Antitrust Case, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 811 (Karl M. Meessen ed., 1996).
357. But see infra note 360.
358. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme,
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1191 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
359. Id. at 1185.
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One might say that American culture was affected because the
computers that were to be reconfigured were physically situated in the United States. What, however, is the real impact on
American culture? There would be a real and significant effect
on American culture if complying with the French order meant
that Yahoo! had to deprive computers worldwide (including
computers in the United States) of access to the auction sites.
Any impact on American culture would be significantly diminished, however, if it were technologically and financially feasible for Yahoo! to restrict access only to computer users located
in France.360 (This is yet another reason why the technological
question was crucial.). 6 ' If the cost of filtering technology were
sufficiently low, Yahoo! could be expected on its own to utilize
geographical filtering technology, with the result that nonFrench computers still would have access to the auction sites. If
there were concern that Yahoo! might opt to altogether eliminate access to the auction sites, thereby impacting American
culture, American law could respond by disallowing Internet
service providers from eliminating U.S. access to materials for
the purpose of complying with foreign countries' content restrictions.36 2
360. Indeed, it is hard to see how a company's compliance with foreign laws
when doing business in a foreign country affects the domestic culture, even
when its compliance actions are undertaken in its home country. It might be
objected that American culture is impacted insofar as America is kept from
exporting information to which it thinks foreigners should have access. Such
an interest in exporting American values, however, is inappropriate under
most accounts. Under a Rawlsian approach for example, it is a violation of the
principle of noninterference with other peoples. See RAWLS, supra note 79, at
37 (discussing the duty of nonintervention). A plausible account of possible
domestic consequences of filtering has been provided by Professor Van Houweling, who has argued that "some speech has attributes of a network good"
such that "[ilt
is more valuable when more people use it." Van Houweling, supra note 326, at 714-15. This claim raises the empirical question of whether
there might be diminishing marginal returns to the size of the network such
that the network benefits do not increase beyond networks of a certain size. In
any event, even if it were the case that network benefits increased continuously with network size, the significance of this would be a function of one's
normative framework. For example, while any such benefits of increasing the
size of the network would categorically counsel against filtering under a game
theoretic approach, any such domestic benefits would be weighed against the
costs imposed on other cultures under a Rawlsian analysis.
361. A related factual question is what percentage of French users the
technology would have to be able to identify to ensure that the law is efficacious. As Professor Goldsmith has insightfully observed, laws need not be onehundred percent enforced to be effective as a practical matter. See Goldsmith,
supra note 288, at 1229-30.
362. Although the Court has not yet clarified the First Amendment's appli-
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To be sure, enforcing the French judgment would have imposed some costs-perhaps even some cultural costs 36 3-in the
United States. It must be recalled, however, that such costs are
not dispositive under an international comparative impairment
analysis. The question is how the costs to France of not enforcing compare to the costs to the United States of enforcing. Persons in the second original position would take account of the
reasonable measures that enforcing jurisdictions could take to
limit the costs of enforcement when undertaking this calculation. If filtering technology is adequate-a point addressed soon
below-steps to limit enforcement's domestic costs could be
taken.
It might be objected that American culture would be
threatened even if technology permitted Yahoo! to target only
French computers. After all, other countries likewise might
demand compliance with their laws, forcing Yahoo! to restrict
access to certain sites for people within their borders. Accordingly, it might be argued, filtering technology would not resolve
the problem, but would only invite a new and different circumstance under which Yahoo! and other Internet service providers
would be overwhelmed: they would have to tailor their output
to the different laws of many different countries. The inability
of Yahoo! to comply with the laws of so many different countries might mean the end of the Internet altogether.
It furthermore might be argued that even if Yahoo! could
survive these costs, ordinary Internet users could not. Enforcing the French judgment against Yahoo!, the argument goes,
would mean that American courts would have to enforce foreign judgments against individuals as well. If individual users
of the Internet were required to comply with all countries' laws
when posting information on the Web, the Internet as we know
it would be crippled.
Further reflection, however, shows that these concerns are
exaggerated. First, the number of countries that could enforce
cation to new media such as the Internet, there is good reason to think that
the type of content-neutral publication requirement discussed above in the
text would not offend the First Amendment. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997) (upholding "must-carry" provisions as applied to cable operators); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 645-45 (1994). Considering possible American legislative responses to
deal with the consequences of enforcing foreign judgments is wholly consistent
with this Article's thesis that the enforcement of foreign judgments is best
suited to executive and legislative determinations.
363. See supra note 360 (discussing Professor Van Houweling's argument).
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their laws against noncitizens is far less than the total number
of countries in the world. Recovery could be had only in those
jurisdictions in which the noncitizen had purposely availed
herself so that the prerequisite of meaningful consent were
met. The case law almost unanimously holds that merely posting materials on the Internet does not create personal jurisdiction in every country in which an Internet connection is
found,364 and this is normatively correct under the consent
analysis provided above."'5 If Yahoo! had not targeted France by
tailoring its advertisement banners, then the French judgment
should not have been enforced due to the absence of meaningful
consent.
Second, the argument against filtering technology is based
on the mistaken assumption that complying with multiple
countries' laws is infeasible. The costs of tailoring output on a
country-by-country basis might be prohibitive for small Internet users, but likely is not for large companies such as Yahoo!.
As a normative matter, the question is how to balance the costs
of compliance against the benefits of respecting each country's
laws, and it may well be sensible for the law to distinguish between "mice" and "elephants," constraining the big players that
can afford to conform their actions while leaving small players
alone. Resolution of this question, once again, turns on political considerations. What is important to observe is that the existence of compliance costs alone does not mean that the foreign
judgment should not be enforced.
Third, and finally, compliance costs themselves are not a
fixed and unchanging quantity, but are the result of technology,
conventions, and social institutions. Moreover, the factors that
determine compliance costs are not static. Instead, they are responsive to external influences, such as the law. If Internet service providers were required to comply with local laws, one
would expect to find the development of technologies, conventions, and institutions that would facilitate compliance and reduce costs. 67

364. I leave for another day the question of Whether such a limitation is
normatively desirable vis-A-vis Internet service providers.
365. See supra Part IV.A.2.
366. Cf. Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice and Privacy: International
Choice of Law and the Internet, 32 INT'L LAW. 991, 993 (1998) (introducing this
distinction).
367. For the locus classicus of this argument, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 59 (1999).
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To be sure, this would result in a different type of Internet
than the free-wheeling, unregulated Int3rnet described by
many Internet advocates. This, however, is merely an observation, not an argument. There is nothing inevitable about or
inherent in the Internet these advocates envision. 369 Their conception of the unregulated Internet reflects American ideals
with which other cultures can disagree,37 ° and would create extensive costs insofar as people, things, and polities can be injured by the Internet in the same way that damages and injuries can be inflicted in real space.371 In short, noting the
consequences that a legal doctrine (such as enforcing foreign
judgments) would have on the Internet is the start, not the end,
of an enormously complex analysis that turns on both technological and normative considerations. Though I cannot hope to
definitively resolve these difficult Internet-related questions
here, it is vital to recognize that these are the relevant considerations to resolving the enforcement question posed by the
Yahoo! case. The evident complexity of these factors strengthens the conclusion offered throughout this Article that enforcement determinations are best undertaken by the political
branches of government.
CONCLUSION
Although foreign judgments based on foreign laws that the
Constitution would not permit an American government to enact certainly are "un-American" insofar as they are premised on
laws that are at variance with American constitutional principles, American courts are not constitutionally precluded from
enforcing them.372 The question then arises as to whether unAmerican judgments should be enforced as a matter of policy.
Because an extensive body of comity case law examines
whether "simple" foreign judgments should be enforced, this
Article looked first to this repository for guidance in analyzing
un-American judgments. The comity case law usefully identifies the various entities that are affected by the enforcement
determination, but the case law is problematically undertheorized. Comity does not provide principled guidance when en368.
of Law
369.
370.
371.
372.

See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370-76 (1996).
See LESSIG,supra note 367, at 59, 88-90.
See id. at 203-04; Reidenberg, supra note 332, at 264-66.
Goldsmith, supra note 288, at 1200, 1239-42.
See Rosen, supra note 1 (manuscript at Part V).
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forcement involves tradeoffs among competing interests, as always is the case with un-American judgments.
Prioritizing among competing principles is a subjective
process that is informed by the decision maker's ante-legal
commitments, a point illustrated by this Article's consideration
of the different analyses that result depending upon whether
one utilizes a game theoretic or a Rawlsian approach to foreign
relations. Several important conclusions follow. To begin, notwithstanding the foundational differences between game theory
and Rawls's The Law of Peoples-the former seeks to advance
only the interests of the United States whereas the latter aims
to realize "fair" outcomes from the perspective of a disinterested third party-both concur that at least some un-American
judgments should be enforced. This highlights the practical
costs to the mistaken constitutional analysis that has been relied upon by American courts to date, which has led them to
conclude that un-American judgments categorically cannot be
enforced as a matter of constitutional law.
Moreover, game theory and Rawlsian analysis both have
institutional implications. Both suggest that the political
branches of government are better suited than courts to formulating a policy regarding the enforcement of un-American judgments. Game theory and Rawlsian analysis also suggest that
international treaties or executive agreements may be particularly good vehicles for generating rules of enforcement. This is
because treaties and executive agreements can help identify focal points that encourage the mutually beneficial cooperative
solution of enforcement (game theory) and can encourage countries to clarify on an ex ante basis the cultural consequences of
nonenforcement so that fair enforcement policies can be generated through a process of international comparative impairment (Rawls).
If the political branches do not take the initiative, then enforcement determinations by default will fall to the courts.
Courts will necessarily be called upon to make deeply political
decisions that affect international relations. The Article does
not champion any one of the plausible competing normative
approaches that could be taken to determine whether unAmerican judgments should be enforced. The Article does show,
however, that many arguments against enforcement fall away
upon careful analysis as it pinpoints the tradeoffs that invariably are involved in deciding whether un-American judgments
are to be enforced.

